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ABSTRACT 
Hizb ut-Tahrir is a transnational Islamic fundamentalist group that operates in 
more than forty countries with main emphasis in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.  The 
group claims to be a political party that proceeds with non-violent means and whose 
ideology is Islam. Its objectives are strictly political, and its main goal is to topple an 
existing regime to resurrect the caliphate with structures and conditions similar to the 
ones of early seventh-century (C.E.) Islam.  The proposed Islamic state will be 
responsible for transforming society in a united Ummah, and for spreading the word of 
Islam throughout the world.  Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) rejects the modern, secular state 
structures and democracy as something “man-made,’ humanly derived and “un-Islamic,” 
and therefore, does not participate in any secular electoral process.  However, HT does 
not reject modern technology and its advantages. 
This research will focus on Hizb ut-Tahrir, its objectives, and its preferences as 
the group adjust its strategies according to the political environment in which it is 
embedded.  The thesis will investigate how HT often uses a legal framework to spread its 
Islamist ideology and how this multifaceted phenomenon is context specific.  The 
conclusion will address policy recommendations that reflect area- and context-related 
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A. THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
 Islamic fundamentalism has been an ongoing threat for the past five decades, 
expanding from its origin in the Middle East.  Its idea and concept was born in the midst 
of a turbulent time, a time in which European colonialism came to an official end and a 
new era of Arab independence began.  New ideologies such as Arab nationalism, Pan-
Arabism, and leftist socialism were to fill the vacuum in the search for Arab unity, 
freedom and economic success after the shackles of colonial dominance came loose.  
“Ba’thism” and “Nasserism” were two major idealistic political concepts that filled the 
gap and changed the whole Middle East from the 1950s on.  However, the various Arab 
regimes that grew out of these ideologies proved to be repressive and militaristic, and in 
the end created more questions than answers, more problems than solutions, while the 
promised political and economic success was far from being achieved. 
 In reaction to these secular Arab ideologies, a new political ideology--based on 
Islam and the motto of a “return to the original message of Islam”—sprang forth. Thus 
was Islamic fundamentalism born, and from its birth it styled itself as nothing less than 
the savior of Muslims and harbinger for their success and glory.  The vision of Islam as a 
political movement, with the objective of establishing an Islamic state ruled by Islamic 
“sharia” law was, and still is today, popular with many Shia and Sunni Islamic 
fundamentalists alike.  They believe in Islam as an all-encompassing system for all 
political, economic, and social aspects of life.  Fundamentalists are convinced that Islam 
as a complete political and societal system does hold the ultimate solution to the 
problems that have been created by secular ideologies.  Entrenched ideologues such as 
Sayyid Qutb and Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi openly criticized both the existing regional 
regimes and the ongoing drive for hegemonial dominance by Western powers.  Their idea 
of couching political objectives in religiously motivated arguments took off, and many 
Islamic movements and groups formed and spread far beyond the borders of the Middle 
East region. 
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 Today, the political ideology based on Islamic fundamentalism has extended and 
survived in many forms and groups–in many regions.  North Africa and Central, South 
and Southeast Asia, as well as Europe and other parts of the world, are dealing with the 
multifaceted phenomenon that roots its argument in an idealistic Islamic ideology that 
strictly opposes all secular notions.  Islamic fundamentalism is not just an ideological, but 
often a physical, threat to modern nation-states.  Militant violence and religiously 
motivated radical extremism are metastases of an as yet uncured cancer that still keeps 
threatening modern societies and governments throughout the world! 
Islamic fundamentalism is a term that is as much discussed as it is misunderstood 
when issues and objectives of Islamic movements are analyzed.  Topic-related 
expressions such as political Islam, Islamism, Salafism, Wahhabism, neo-
fundamentalism, and even Jihadist-Salafism are used by various analysts, commentators 
and journalists today, often without the knowledge and clarification as to where the 
differences between these categories and sub-categories are.  Admittedly, things are more 
complex and frontiers are more elusive than any type of block categorization would be 
able to demonstrate.  Some of these ideologies and respective movements have built on 
one another, partially with overlapping goals, but at the same time with major differences 
and distinctions in extent and methodology.  For the purpose of this thesis, certain 
commonalities, differences, and historical evolutions must be made first be made clear in 
order to understand where the over-five-decade-old Islamic movement of “Hizb ut-
Tahrir” can be categorized, in order to make a threat analysis and solid projections for 
the group’s further development.1 
 One of the overarching commonalities of all these different Islamic ideologies lies 
in the idealized view of early Islamic history.  The “glory of the seventh century,” the 
golden times of the “rightly guided caliphs” or the “Rashidun Caliphate”--all these terms 
describe the success and power of early Islam between 622 C.E. and 654 C.E., the time 
span in which the Prophet Muhammad and his early companions (later his successors or 
caliphs) reigned over the first Islamic state.  The vacuum between the Sasanian-Persian 
                                                 
1 The group of Hizb ut-Tahrir is also known as Hizb al-Tahrir, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami and Hizb al-
Tahrir al-Islami, with the respective abbreviations HT, HaT, and HuT.  For the purpose of this thesis, the 
group will be referred to as Hizb ut-Tahrir, or in abbreviated style as HT. 
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Empire in the East and the Byzantine Empire in the West had been filled with “Islam,” an 
all-encompassing system including religious, political, economic, and socio-cultural 
guidelines for followers of the faith.  The different Islamic ideologies founded within the 
last two centuries share a strong desire to restore the original purity of the early times, 
while most of them believe in the strict interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunna to help 
Muslims regain the strength and succession of early Islam.  Salafism (to follow or 
precede [the Prophet Muhammad]), an ideology of the second half of the 19th century, 
emphasized the importance of the return to sharia law, and the pristine, pure, and 
orthodox form of Islam.  It did not develop a single unified movement of its own, 
although a wide range of Muslims from the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and other major 
regions believe in that “backward-looking” idealistic view of Islam.  Most of the earlier 
Salafi followers rejected violence as a means, while followers of the late 20th century 
considered using militant and violent actions a legitimate means in order to achieve their 
objectives.  The “Saudi brand” of Salafism, widely known as Wahhabism, is more 
specific in its methodology and is extremely intolerant against any deviation from Islamic 
doctrine.  Wahhabism rejects even centuries-old traditions such as Sufism (a spiritual and 
mystic tradition of Islam) and is known to proceed with violence against any deviant 
interpretation of Islam.  Devastating conquests and occupations of Islamic sanctuaries 
and demolition of holy shrines and saints can be associated with Wahhabism of the 19th 
century.  Wahhabism is ultra-orthodox and puritanical in its strict and single-minded 
interpretation of Islam.  In the same vein, early fundamentalists of the 1950s, Islamists of 
the 1960s and 70s, and second-generation Islamists from the 1980s on often refer to the 
strict and literal interpretation of Islam as a harbinger of rekindled glory and success for 
Muslim societies.     
 The socio-political differences between the Islamic ideologies, on the other hand, 
are far more diffuse.  Their roots can mainly be associated with the political conditions 
and historic evolution of the last century.  The relative decline of the Ottoman empire in 
the late 19th century and the rise of the “West,” followed by the colonial dominance of the 
European powers through the late 19th and early 20th century, gave many Islamic rulers, 
thinkers, and ideologues reason to look into why Muslims became increasingly objects 
4 
rather than subjects of history.2  The final fall of the last existing caliphate in 1924 and 
the birth of the state of Israel in 1948 were two decisive—but by far not the only--
elements that inspired and infuriated Islamic revivalists of the last century.     
Islamic modernists such as Sir Seyyed Ahmed Khan, Sayyid Jamal al-Din ‘al-
Afghani’, and Muhammad Abduh were key persons in developing ideological structures 
that should “reconstruct, revive, and synthesize Islam in order to make Islam relevant to 
the needs, demands, and predicaments of those whom they considered the victims of 
modern civilization.”3  The re-creation of Islamic values in an ethical and socio-economic 
context, the elimination of zulm (doing evil) in Islamic societies, and a strict return to 
faith and religion were believed to bring salvation for the shattered and temporarily 
inferior Muslim societies.  Islamic modernism was not an act of surrender to the superior 
Western culture, but rather was a reform that was to project the best of other societies 
into the Islamic ones.  It did not completely reject the West, although it did reject the 
excesses such as colonialism, imperialism, and atheism.  However, internal factors within 
Islam, like clerical leadership, sectarian conflicts, and the centuries-old discussion of the 
pros and cons of the closed “gates of ijtihad” limited Islam as a whole in adapting to 
modernity, according to Islamic modernists.4  Al-Afghani and Abduh argued for a 
modernization based on Islamic principles, achieved by re-opening the doors of ijtihad, 
and allowing the re-interpretation of the primary sources of Islam in light of changing 
circumstances.  They both believed in adapting law and morality to modernity in order 
for Islam to progress. 
 The ideology of Islamic fundamentalism grew out of the modernist movement of 
the 1900s.  However, a political agenda with political objectives was now combined with 
religion, resulting in an increasing instrumentalization of Islam for solely political 
purposes.  “Purging Islam of all alien elements” best summarizes the critique of Islamic 
fundamentalists.  Social, political, economic, and cultural changes had been addressed by 
                                                 
2 Mohammed Ayyob, “Political Islam: Image and Reality,” World Policy Journal, Fall 2004, p. 2.  
3 Ali Rahnema, ed., Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London, UK: Zed Books Ltd, 1994), p. 6. 
4  Note: Ijtihad can be understood as independent legal reasoning, a process that had been abandoned 
ten centuries ago.  Primary sources of Islam (i.e., the Qur’an and the sunna) were allowed to be interpreted; 
the opposite is the strict imitation (taqlid) of those sources.  Some scholars argue that the closure of the gate 
of ijtihad prevents Islam from adapting to the ongoing process of historical evolution.    
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a lay religious, but educated and intellectual cadre.  Key figures such as Hasan al-Banna, 
Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb strived to liberate the Muslim societies 
and culture from their subjugation to both colonial rulers and repressive Arab 
governments, bringing them back to a status of equality.  Some ideologues such as 
Sayyid Qutb argued that there is “no room for ijtihad…since no one is allowed to devise 
a law and say that it is according to the law of God unless it is declared that God is the 
Legislator,” and preferred strict taqlid, an imitation of the early times of Islam under the 
Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors.5   
A proposed implementation of sharia law, the goal of resurrecting a caliphate, 
diverse historical interpretations on the use of jihad, and the use of violence versus non-
violence have distinguished hundreds of Islamic fundamentalist movements worldwide 
from the mid 20th century on in their respective agendas to achieve political goals in the 
realm of the divine.  Islamic fundamentalists throughout the Middle East were often 
suppressed by repressive Arab nationalist governments of the 1950s and 1960s, and are 
still suppressed today, for their open opposition to current authoritative regimes.  Groups 
and parties such as Hizb ut-Tahrir rejected the opportunity to join any type of political 
participation or even electoral processes and denounced those political systems as un-
Islamic.    The 1960s and 1970s brought forth another category of “politicized Islamic 
ideology,” widely referred to as Islamism or political Islam.  The critique of an existing 
order in the Arab and Muslim world was as central as the critique of the Western world’s 
dominance and hegemony.  Islam became increasingly instrumentalized to bolster 
arguments that addressed social, political, economic, and cultural changes alike.  Even 
though the “West” was critiqued, modern western technology was not.  Weapons and 
communication tools were used by many Islamists to “enhance” their arguments.  Their 
political agenda was driven by educated intellectuals who strove to recruit foot soldiers 
from the urbanized masses and lower classes--unemployed youth with no prospect for 
upward mobility in their systems.    
                                                 
5  Seyyid Qutb, Milestones (Dar Al-Ilm, Damascus, Syria,----), p. 85. 
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But as a product and consequence of failed political Islam of the 1960s and 1970s, 
neo-fundamentalist movements rose up by the 1980s that favored less politics and more 
virtue and purity by grassroots activism.  A gradual transformation and slow Islamization 
of society became of higher priority to neo-fundamentalists who were now seeking active 
political participation and representation.  Some of them ascended from the local  to the 
national level and saw socio-political issues beyond territorial borders as the new 
battlefield in the frame of globalization.  However, with the continuation of second-
generation Islamists, the emphasis on “jihad” as a global struggle and random violence 
against societies mutated into the central notion for international and transnational 
Islamic ideologies known as the “Jihadist-Salafism” ideology. 
 The borders among the various Islamic doctrines are elusive and far more obscure 
than this rough categorization of ideologies and movements has demonstrated.  As pure 
political objectives remain the central driving factor of Islamic fundamentalists’ agenda, 
it is of the highest importance to continuously analyze and evaluate every movement in 
its current environment and context alike in order to make solid projections and policy 
implications.    
B. HIZB UT-TAHRIR AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE CALIPHATE 
1. History of the Islamic Caliphate 
The caliphate has always had an extraordinary meaning for Muslims worldwide.  
It describes a form of Islamic government in which the head of a state is the “Khalifah,” 
or caliph (successor, or representative).  He is the leader of the Umma (Muslim 
community) and reigns as a representative of God on earth in accordance with the 
divinely given law–the sharia.  With the death of the Prophet Muhammad, his four closest 
companions and successors (Abu Bakr, Umar ibn al-Khattab, Uthman ibn Affan, and Ali 
ibn Abi Talib) reigned in sequence over the first Islamic state, founded by Muhammad in 
622 C.E.   The caliphate was, from the early times of Islam onward, considered a just and 
legitimate system of rule for Muslims.  The legal framework of the system was 
manifested in the Qur’an and the sunna (sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad 
and his closest companions), and continued to have a binding character for the caliphs to 
come in the  history of Islam.  The death of Ali ibn Abi Talib in 661 C.E. marked  the end 
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of the era of the “rightly guided caliphs,” and a new epoch in Islam began with dynasties 
and empires such as the Ummayyad, Abbasid, and Ottoman.  The Ottoman Empire is 
considered the last official caliphate, and finally disintegrated in 1924.  
The leaders and successors after the first four caliphs often believed in more 
authority than just that divinely given through the Qur’an and the sunna, and soon after, 
debates and conflicts started to arise over where the authority of a caliph ends.  
Religiously trained elite, the ulema, were believed to possess the knowledge about the 
religion and jurisdiction, resulting in many conflicts between the Muslim ruler and these 
Islamic scholars. This is an ongoing issue of internal conflict within Islam to this day.  
Many Muslims believe in a system where a Muslim leader is actively supported by a 
religiously trained ulema (e.g., Iran, Saudi Arabia), but only a minority sharply defends 
the caliphate system of the first four “rightly guided” caliphs that possessed combined 
power over politics, religion, and jurisdiction of an Islamic state.  
The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and its consequences marked the end of 
the last worldwide caliphate.  Deposing the last caliph Abdul Mejid and abolishing the 
caliphate in March 1924 swept aside thirteen centuries of accumulated Islamic tradition.6  
As a few Islamic groups and movements continue to believe in the success and 
rightfulness of the caliphate system, a transnational Islamic group named Hizb ut-Tahrir 
follows its own vision of resurrecting the caliphate to create a “just ruling system” that 
eventually would expand beyond any historic Islamic border.   
2. The Vision of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) is a transnational Islamic fundamentalist 
group that operates in more than forty countries with main emphasis regions in Europe, 
the Middle East, and Asia.  The group claims to be a political party, with its ideology 
being Islam. Its objectives are strictly political, and its main goal is to topple an existing 
regime and to resurrect the caliphate to create structures and conditions similar to the 
times of the Prophet Muhammad and early seventh-century (C.E.) Islam.  According to 
HT, any nation-state qualifies for being the founding territory to establish the caliphate, 
although an Arab or a Muslim state is best suited.  Once established, the proposed Islamic 
                                                 
6 William Cleveland, “A History of the Modern Middle East,” (Westview Press, Perseus Book Group, 
Colorado, 2004), pp. 180-181.  
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state will then be responsible for transforming its society into a united umma, and for 
spreading the word of Islam throughout the rest of the world.  Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects the 
modern, secular state structure and democracy as something “man-made,’ humanly 
derived and “un-Islamic.”.  This self-proclaimed political party does not participate in 
any type of secular elections throughout its regions of presence.  Hizb ut-Tahrir does, on 
the other hand, not oppose modern progress and modern technology, whose advantages 
and benefits it willingly accepts and uses.   
Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1953 in Hebron by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1907-
1977), previously a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, who was inspired by the Islamic 
activist and thinker Seyyid Qutb.  In the same year, Nabhani published his book Nidham 
uI-Islam, which remains the ideological foundation for the organization, especially as it 
contains the 186 articles of the “Constitution for an Islamic State.”  As with other Islamic 
organizations, Hizb ut-Tahrir sees Islam as an all-encompassing system that includes 
politics, economics, and socio-cultural aspects of life.  Nation-states and secularism are 
continuously rejected as part of the party’s overarching policy that strives to resurrect the 
caliphate, one led by a caliph and inspired by the success and glory of seventh-century 
Islam.  The “clash of civilizations” between the “man-made” capitalist Western 
civilization and the “spiritual and divine” Islamic one is inevitable.7    According to HT, 
this clash has been primarily intellectual for centuries, but also a political, economic, and 
military struggle about the concepts of civilizations between the “kufr” and Islam.  The 
intellectual struggle is considered obligatory for Muslims; even if it is not initiated by the 
“kufr” (unbeliever) civilizations.8 
Hizb ut-Tahrir stresses the practice of jihad in its publications. The group 
advocates waging jihad to seize power, with, however, the emphasis on doing so in a 
non-violent way.  Once in power, it is not clear if and how jihad will then be used to 
                                                 
7 Note: The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilization is the translation of the Arabic named publication 
Hatmiyyat sira’a Ul-hadharat by Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
8 Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2002. The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilization (London, GB: Al-Khilafah 
Publications), pp. 40-62. Note: Hizb ut-Tahrir has withdrawn the internet publication for public access in 
late 2005. A copy is held by the thesis author. 
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spread the message of Islam--one of the obligations of all Muslims.9  The Qur’an 
contains references to both types of jihad, the active and militant type--referring to 
warfare action--and the more passive and spiritual, the internal struggle of a Muslim with 
himself.  After the Prophet Muhammad had established the first Islamic state in Medina 
by peaceful means, he waged a jihad that was more violent and militant to spread Islam 
through the heartland of the Arabian Peninsula.   
Hizb ut-Tahrir makes many references to this early period of Islam without 
clarifying its own intentions after the ultimate achievement of the Islamic state.  The 
group states in its proposed Constitution for an Islamic State that its foreign relations with 
states such as England, America, and France are considered as “at war”.10  How this war 
will be defined or even fought is not laid out in its current policy publications.  Another 
relevant issue HT consistently addresses is the rejection of “infidel” societies and 
“apostate” state regimes.  It opposes the current Arab regimes in the Middle East and 
accuses them of blasphemy for the limited implementation of Islamic “sharia” law.  
Notions such as democracy, liberty, and the sovereignty of states contradict the law of 
Islam according to HT.  Even contemporary Islamic governments as in Iran and Saudi 
Arabia are not accepted due to their limited application of Islamic laws.  The radical and 
extreme political agenda is evident in the party’s perception of the state of Israel.  Israel 
and its Jewish population are considered to be the biggest evil and are ultimately to be 
fought in order to achieve a complete Islamization in the Muslim and Arab World.  “The 
only legally permissible encounter between Jews and Muslims is on the jihad battlefield,” 
expresses the tough and militant stand on the Arab-Israeli dispute.11   One of Hizb ut-
Tahrir’s main objectives is still to “free” all Muslim societies from Western ideological 
influences by fighting the dominance of the imperialistic Western regimes.   
The group allegedly maintains its Headquarters in London, Great Britain, while 
the German “Innenmisterium” (Ministry of Interior) assumes that the group intends to 
                                                 
9 Suha Taji-Farouki, 1996. A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic 
Caliphate (London, England: Grey Seal), p. 194 (Article 11). 
10 Ibid, p. 215. 
11 Suha Taji-Farouki, “Islamists and the Threat of Jihad: Hizb al-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun on Israel 
and the Jews, “Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4. October 2000, p. 28. 
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build similar organization structures within Germany.  Germany banned the group 
successfully in January 2003 for its anti-Semitic rhetoric and propaganda; however, an 
estimated 150 HT fundamentalists continue to work underground.   The July 2005 
bombings of London’s subways and increasingly “anti-Zionist” proclamations in Great 
Britain, Denmark, and the Netherlands bring the group more and more into the crosshairs 
of all central European governments.          
C. ARGUMENTS AND RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
Hizb ut-Tahrir alters its tactics and strategy in the various regions in which it is 
active. It appears that the political and social environments present in Europe, the Middle 
East, and Asia (mainly Central and South Asia) influence the intensity and type of action 
HT applies.  Because HT openly addressed anti-Semitic issues with slogans and credible 
planned actions against Jews in Europe, the group faced prosecution in Germany and 
other European countries. As a result, HT changed its public rhetoric; however, a 
fundamental change in thought is unlikely due to its unchanged public objectives over the 
last five decades.  The organization proceeds in a more aggressive manner throughout the 
Central Asian states.  Uzbekistan has charged Hizb ut-Tahrir in the 1999 assassination 
attempt on President Islam Karimov, while in Azerbaijan six members were convicted for 
an attempted overthrow of the government.  Uzbekistan officials insist that HT 
contradicts the legislation of the republic by instigating, organizing, and executing 
terrorist acts, not to mention the group’s organization of illegal armed bands and criminal 
groupings.  Hizb ut-Tahrir’s current existence in the Middle East is highly speculative.  
Due to its official abandonment as a party in the 1950s and early 60s, the group was 
forced to go underground; therefore, hardly any reliable data is available decades later.  
Statistics of jailed HT members are published sporadically by some Middle Eastern 
governments and Human Rights Watch indicates that the group is active in the region, 
since hundreds of followers and sympathizers have been jailed and/or tortured in Middle 
Eastern countries.  The combination of growing worldwide HT membership, ongoing 
anti-Semitic announcements and propaganda, and the unfathomable strategy of jihad 
against ‘kufr’ and ‘infidel’ societies and governments lead to the assumption that HT 
continues to be a viable threat to today’s existing governments. 
11 
The thesis executes a strategic-choice approach and elucidates three different 
cases.  The historical development in the regions of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia 
will strengthen the analysis and projection of the group’s future behavior.  This case 
comparison is exceptionally useful in the analysis of this Islamic movement that alters 
tactics and strategies according to the political environment in which it is embedded.  
Group ideology, methodology, and fundamental structures and thoughts are addressed in 
the second part of the thesis, while the third shows the historical evolution and diverse 
authoritative interpretations of Jihad, and how those continue to influence both violent 
and non-violent Islamic ideologies such as Hizb ut-Tahrir’s. The thesis will conclude that 
Hizb ut-Tahrir is a multifaceted phenomenon that attempts to mask an Islamist threat 
with a legal façade.  The group uses socio-religious content to disguise its deeply political 
objectives in order to seize power.  Historic evolution and facts on the ground indicate 
that this idealistic view of a caliphate is outmoded and no longer realistic.  The exemplary 
caliphate under the “rightly guided caliphs” existed for a mere thirty-two years in the 
seventh century, whereas the following thirteen-hundred years of Islamic history have 
shown various forms of Islamic governance and tradition that cannot be negated.  The 
idealistic view of Hizb ut-Tahrir is an ideological threat to the modern nation-state and 
the Westphalian synthesis of 1648, which separated matters of politics from religion and 































II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND HIZB UT-TAHRIR 
A. MIDDLE EAST 
1. A Complex and Demanding Political Environment  
Taqim al-Din al-Nabhani was born in 1909 in Palestine and is the founder of the 
political party and Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT).  He was the son of a teacher of 
Islamic sciences and the grandson of a prominent judge associated with the Ottoman 
state.  Taqim al-Din al-Nabhani, a 1932 graduate of al-Azhar in Cairo, went on to become 
a teacher in Haifa, Palestine.  He altered his career in favor of his interest in Islamic law a 
few years later and became a judge in the Islamic court in Ramleh.  Al-Nabhani was 
actively engaged in the political environment of Palestine even before its fall in 1948.  He 
maintained contacts with former study colleagues in Egypt, and was continuously 
involved in an Islamic society called Jam’iyyat al-I’tisam.  The establishment of a 
political party with the objective of Islamic revival was an early-proclaimed goal of his.12   
The origin of the Islamic movement Hizb ut-Tahrir lies in the diverse and 
complex political environment of Palestine and the surrounding Arab states in the late 
1940s and early 1950s.  The established rulers of the Arab states were not viewed as 
legitimate by many, as they had no representation from their respective societies.  Mostly, 
they were chosen from the minorities as a result of indirect British—or direct French—
ruling, and were left with little power in high politics.  While the colonial epoch was 
designed to prepare the Arab states for democracy and modernity, the result tended to be 
quite different.  Weak state structures, a lack of industrialization, large-scale peasantry, 
and impoverished societies with artificial identities were some of the conditions under 
which the colonial powers handed these states their independence.  The following era in 
the Middle East was initially defined by a wave of secular Pan-Arabism.13  The new elite, 
mainly from the military, created Arab nationalism from the top-down.  It was meant to 
be the answer for the lack of identity and the lack of consolidated state institutions.  
Notions of an Arab unity combined with socialism, proclaimed by the Ba’th party, or the 
                                                 
12 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, p. 2.  
13 Middle East is defined in this thesis to include the Arab world plus Iran, Turkey, and Israel. 
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circles of identities (African, Arab, Islamic) embraced by the Egyptian President Nasser 
were supposed to be the harbinger of physical unity, common identity, and economic 
success in the Arab world, although subsequent history proved to be the opposite.  
Corrupt state leaders, repressed societies, and stagnated economies dominated by state-
led development were the fate of the Middle East in the 1950s.  The creation of the state 
of Israel in 1948 was just another sign of the continuous power of Western imperialism, 
as well as the impotence of the Muslim population.   
The social, economic, and political conditions in the heart of the Middle East 
were virulent when al-Nabhani offered his ideology as the ultimate solution to the 
problem.  It was a strict Islamic ideology, one that was designed to bring back the Islamic 
spirit and power to withstand the ill-perceived ideologies of socialism, communism, and 
state capitalism. In November 1952, al-Nabhani applied for official recognition of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir as a political platform in Jordan.  The application was rejected for the reason of 
incompatibility of the party’s ideology, one that opposes the constitution and the regime 
of the country.  The regime was aware of the fact that one of the group’s projected goals 
was the eventual seizure of power.  After the denial of permission to operate as a political 
party, al-Nabhani and his co-founders decided to register the group as an association in 
the West Bank, a possibility that was available as a leftover from old Ottoman law, which 
still applied in part of the West Bank.  Sir John Bagot Glubb, a British officer and Chief 
of Staff of the Jordanian Army urged the regime to react harshly to that backdoor move 
and declared HT’s activities illegal.  A law called the “Preaching and Guiding Law” was 
passed in 1954 banning members of the party to give speeches in local mosques. Jordan 
reacted strictly to HT’s request, although it allowed the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) to act 
as an association.  The intentions of HT were evidently political, while the ones from MB 
were considered to be religious, educational, and social in character.14  Even its founder 
al-Nabhani was treated severely by denying him re-entry into Jordan, after a trip to 
Damascus.   In consequence of this, al-Nabhani relocated to Damascus in November 
1953, from where he continued to lead Hizb ut-Tahrir.  The organization was very active 
throughout Jordan and the West Bank and held study circles to identify and build cadres, 
which were ultimately to be responsible for further recruitment of members.  Muslims 
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with religious education and affiliations were the prime leadership, along with teachers, 
merchants, and even military officers from the Arab Legion. At the time, Hizb ut-Tahrir 
was also in contact with representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, and plans to unite 
the two movements were certainly discussed, although never realized.  The ideologies 
seemed not to coincide, in part due to HT’s claim that the Muslim Brotherhood showed 
too much of a liking for secular ideas.  
In Jordan, the organization was forbidden to have activists talk openly or 
distribute leaflets in public, so HT slowly expanded their radius of action to reach 
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq in the 1960s.  The leadership was convinced and optimistic that 
large parts of the society would follow HT’s notions, and two attempted coups took place 
in Jordan in 1968 and 1969.  A third coup in Jordan was at least discussed if not 
executed; however, no reliable information on this is available. Neither of them was 
successful, since they were revealed early enough to the King by an unknown member.  
The group felt that the liberation of Muslims should not wait much longer, for the next 
attempted coup took place in Iraq in 1972.   With this unsuccessful last attempt at 
overthrowing a government, HT went into a phase of stagnation in the Middle East.   
Political Islam, in general, appeared to be on the rise in the late 1960s and 1970s 
after Arab nationalism had ultimately failed.  The devastating Arab defeat (Egypt, Syria, 
and Jordan) against Israel in 1967 showed the inability of Arab regimes to solve the 
Palestinian conflict.  Saudi Arabia’s wealth and power through its natural resource of oil 
left the impression that Islam rewards the Islamic state that has been created by the House 
of Saud.  “The Khilafat (caliphate) movement in India, the creation of a Muslim Pakistan, 
and the use of Islamic symbolism that accompanied the struggles for freedom from 
European colonialism in Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, and Pakistan [were] all 
indications of how Islam played a major role in mass mobilization in moments of 
political crisis.”15  
Al-Nabhani died on 20 June 1977 in Beirut, and ‘Abd al-Qadim Zallum assumed 
leadership over the party until his death in early 2003.  There was speculation on 
Zallum’s whereabouts during his lifetime; many believed him to be in Amman, while 
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according to other undisclosed sources he was in Lebanon during the last stage of his life.  
During the late 1970s, the leadership of Hizb ut-Tahrir was in contact with Ayatollah 
Khomeini.  A proposed constitution for an Islamic state was presented to Khomeini in 
hope that he would take it as the basis for the Islamic regime after the revolution in Iran, 
but Khomeini did not react to the received offer.  The organization found itself in a 
stalemate situation during the 1980s.  Three decades had passed since its founding and, 
besides the unsuccessful coups between 1969 and 1972, little progress was evident.  Hizb 
ut-Tahrir was not able to develop a broad popular support base in the Middle East and 
continued to struggle for followers of its ideology.         
2. Last Generation Developments in the Main Emphasis Areas 
Although the support base of Hizb ut-Tahrir was small and powerless in the 
Middle East, it still managed to spread its ideology throughout the Muslim countries by 
the 1990s.  “[The] party currently operates in Jordan, Syria, the Occupied Territories, 
Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Sudan, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia.”16   The fact that 
the party was banned in most Arab countries since its formation made it more 
complicated to track its presence and growth in all these states.  The heart of its 
emergence was in the Palestine territory in 1953 and even four to five decades later the 
presence and activities in the general Levant area remain a focus area for the group.  
Secret study circles and sporadic leaflet activities are frequent and constant enough to 
keep the flame alive.   
The developments of the last two decades have showed much more liberalization 
towards Hizb ut-Tahrir in Jordan.  The group is allowed a limited public voice, which it 
uses for press conferences and various other public statements such as talk in mosque 
facilities and media statements.  The Jordanian offer from 1989 to take part in the 
political process was, however, rebuffed by HT itself. The group asserts that with a 
participation in elections it would have to declare that its political objectives are not 
against the constitution of the country, which cannot be reconciled with the projected 
resurrection of a caliphate.  A complete normalization between the Jordanian government 
and Hizb ut-Tahrir is not to be expected due to another controversy.  As the group’s 
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Jordanian spokesman in Amman stated in May 1994: “There can be no peaceful relations 
with the Jews: this is prohibited by Islamic law. It is also prohibited to settle for only part 
of Palestine…It is impossible to solve the problem of Palestine by peaceful means: what 
is required is actual war, in the form of jihad.”17   What a jihad of Hizb ut-Tahrir might 
look like will be discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis.   
Other countries in the Levant area act more strictly to the presence of Hizb ut-
Tahrir.  Syria, for example, currently imprisons over two hundred HT members and the 
government keeps close track and files on all member information.  It is unclear how 
many HT followers are in the Palestinian areas of Gaza and West Bank, although there is 
no doubt about their general presence. HT’s constituency is rather limited in these 
territories, since its objectives are rather long-term, versus the required short-term 
successes proclaimed by HAMAS and Islamic Jihad Palestine.18  Almost all other Middle 
East states oppose the presence of Hizb ut-Tahrir.  Egypt banned the party in 1974 and 
jailed over twenty-six members in 2002, Libya over sixty in the same year, and Lebanon 
several dozen over the last five years.  The numbers do vary from source to source, and 
the reported ones seem to reflect a reasonable count, provided and published by Human 
Rights Watch.   
The Gulf countries have so far reported a very low level of activity by HT.  Oman 
claims to have no presence of group members, while Saudi Arabia has some in the 
eastern part of the Hijaz.  Activities in Saudi Arabia are limited and considered extremely 
dangerous, since the distribution of leaflets leads to immediate imprisonment for Saudis 
and even to torture for non-Saudis.19  The major ideology is still dictated by the 
Wahhabis in the heartland of the Arabian Peninsula.   
All in all, it is worth noting that reliable and diverse information is hard to come 
by.  Hizb ut-Tahrir publishes information on methodology and ideology on its own  
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website; however, conclusions on the intensity of presence are not possible.  Information 
through the governments in the region is also limited and most likely biased due to local 
political implications.     
B. EUROPE 
1. The Open Playground 
The shortage of workers in many European countries from the 1960s on led to 
policies in which foreign workers (also often referred to as “guest workers”) were called 
to fill the vacancies in mainly lower-class jobs.  Many workers came from Arab and/or 
Muslim countries, especially from Turkey, Pakistan, and North Africa, but also from the 
Balkans and the Middle East.  Many of these workers became unemployed after a few 
years, as the European economies recovered, yet they did not leave their host countries.  
Their families followed them to Europe, and the Muslim minorities developed into the 
strongest faction of minorities in many European states.   
The causation of sore needs for labor influenced the developing relationship 
between the Muslims in Europe and their respective host governments.   Social and 
cultural integration into local societies happened slowly for guest workers, and was very 
limited through the 1970s and early 1980s.  Also this is often believed to be the Muslim 
immigrants’ fault, it must be stated that the European governments at the time were not 
fully prepared for this new challenge, either.  Language programs, school integration, and 
cultural tolerance are only a few of the issues that needed attention by both Muslim 
immigrants and European governments.  The partial dysfunction of cultural and societal 
integration led to some segregation of Muslim groups.  “In France and other European 
countries, adolescents from Muslim families increasingly turn to rigorous practice of 
Islam, often a badge of cultural identity for second- and third-generation youths from 
immigrant families who feel marooned in Western society.”20  Great Britain and the 
Netherlands were among the few who were able to establish multicultural societies with 
fewer visible integration problems.  It should be stressed that the blank existence of 
Muslims in European societies did not, by itself, create the problem of Islamism;  
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however, the grievances of segregated and excluded Muslims and the largely open 
borders between these countries certainly fueled the emergence of Islamist extremism in 
Europe.21 
The emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Europe can be traced back at least to the 
1980s, when the first party leaflets were distributed in Romania and (former) Yugoslavia; 
at the same time, the first activists arrived in the British Isles.  Other sources claim an 
earlier presence in Great Britain, in the 1970s, based on the fact that HT was not able to 
establish a constituency in Turkey, and therefore moved on into the heart of Europe to 
benefit from the greater political openness.22  Hizb ut-Tahrir used this political liberty in 
Europe to settle down and build headquarters structures to spread its ideology, via 
modern media, into a liberal society.  Currently, Hizb ut-Tahrir operates in many 
European countries, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Great Britain, and 
Germany.               
2. Germany 
No exact date on HT’s first appearance in Germany can be agreed upon, but 
German Security Services has kept an eye on the group for over a decade now.  Hizb ut-
Tahrir distributed flyers and pamphlets in the same way as in other European countries.  
The propaganda material was distributed in several languages, such as Arabic, German, 
Turkish, and Urdu.  Primary recruiting targets were mainly educated middle-to-upper-
class society and students from technical universities such as the TU in Berlin.  
Dissemination of brochures and other publications such as the magazine “Explizit” also 
took place near Islamic centers and mosques in bigger cities within Germany.23  Hizb ut-
Tahrir’s radical ideology and methodology quickly created suspicion in government 
institutions.  On 10 January 2003, German Minister of the Interior Otto Schily announced 
a ban of HT within Germany.  The party was claimed to misuse the liberal law and order 
of German democratic principles to spread propaganda for violence and anti-Semitic 
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campaigns.  Previous bans on the “Kalifatstaat” and the donation/charity association “Al-
Aqsa” were precursors for the tougher responses from the German government on foreign 
extremists’ organizations.  New laws and regulations, effective since after the terror 
attacks of 2001, enabled the government to ban groups that undermine the German law.   
The propaganda meeting of 27 October 2002 at the Technical University in Berlin 
confirmed the group’s radical view by openly denouncing Israel’s right of existence and 
subsequently calling for its destruction.  The call for the death of the Jewish population 
and the radical rhetoric for change in governance (general statements, not specifically for 
regime change in Germany) led to the decision to revoke HT’s legal status in Germany.  
A police search through twenty-seven suspicious apartments of HT members brought 
282,000 Euros, 53,000 Deutsche Marks, vast amounts of propaganda material, and even 
highly suspicious chemicals in one apartment in Muenster.24   The court appeal to reverse 
the final ban on the group was rejected once more in January 2006; however, eager 
members of Hizb ut-Tahrir continue to spread their ideological interpretations of “al-
Wasatiyya” (compromise) on three different German-registered websites.  In an October 
2004 article on one of these sites, the HT author stresses that there is no such thing as a 
compromise for political solutions; “Islam would not allow this.”  He also reiterates that 
integration into European culture and lifestyle must be rejected for the incompatibility of 
values such as personal freedom, sexuality, and religion. German law enforcement closed 
these sites and pressed charges against the owner, who resides within Germany.25          
3. Great Britain 
Great Britain seems always to have had a special importance for Hizb ut-Tahrir.  
The group entrenched itself in the island nation in the early 1980s, along with those 
invited to fill the demand in the labor force.  Hizb ut-Tahrir started in a standardized 
manner by holding study circles mainly among young students.  A growing constituency 
of Pakistanis, Somalis, and Turks established a presence in and around London, 
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Birmingham, Bradford, and Sheffield.26  By the end of the 1980s, HT established its own 
media center, “Al-Khilafah”, from which it prints books, leaflets, journals, and other 
distributed publications.  
The British population and government started to be concerned about HT when 
the group insensitively spread its anti-Semitic rhetoric in speech and publications.  In 
response to the Kuwaiti airliner hijacking in 1988, HT published a response entitled “The 
Islamic rule on hijacking aeroplanes.”  In this two-page article, the HT representative 
clearly states the rightfulness of hijacking an aircraft that belongs to a “kafir” 
(unbelieving) country that is considered to be “at war with” Muslims, like Israel.27 “… 
[the] hijacking or destruction of planes or terrorizing or killing those on board, all this is 
harm [unlawful] from the Islamic viewpoint, except if the aeroplane’s passengers belong 
to a Kafir state at war with Muslims.”28  According to HT’s article 185 in the proclaimed 
constitution of an Islamic state, states such as the U.S., Britain, France, and Russia would 
fall into this category.29  The quarterly English journal “Al-Fajr” along with other medial 
appearances became the primary platform to spread HT’s view on current political events 
and its brand of Islamic ideology.  Hizb ut-Tahrir’s propaganda was especially attuned to 
the “underprivileged, suffering from poor housing, high unemployment and racial 
discrimination…[and] the party gives [these] alienated young Muslims a sense of 
belonging, and an unequivocal answer to their search for an identity.”30  The group 
competed against other Islamic groups in Britain by either influencing or interrupting 
ongoing meetings, or even by holding equivalent sessions themselves a few hundreds 
yards away from other Islamic groups.  One of the big differences, however, was that HT 
has never claimed to solve the problem of delivering social goods to its constituency;  
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rather, it advocated the resurrection of the caliphate as the first and most important step.  
All the other problems would regulate themselves with the proper implementation of 
Islamic ruling.   
Hizb ut-Tahrir was soon perceived to be a threat for the British non-Muslim and 
Muslim societies alike.  It created a schism between the Muslim populations by offering 
its own interpretation of Islam, and was also a growing influential threat to the non-
Muslim British way of life.  Although one HT leader stated in 1994 that “[we] don’t want 
to establish the Khilafah in Europe or in Britain; that would be wrong because we say we 
must resume an Islamic way of life which must take place in a Muslim country,” the 
party continued to spread its anti-Jewish rhetoric and even threatened murder against 
British politicians such as Prime Minister John Major in 1991.   
The events of 11 September shed a new and more intense light on Islamic groups 
advocating radical views and rhetoric.  Although Hizb ut-Tahrir was never known to be 
involved in any terrorist activities, the call for banning the group in Britain became 
louder.  A governmental announcement in August 2005 by Prime Minister Tony Blair of 
the intention to proscribe Hizb ut-Tahrir was perceived as very controversial.  The new 
clause of “glorification” in the British anti-terror bill might not be sufficient to proscribe 
the group, as Hizb ut-Tahrir can only be accused of “providing inspiration to potential 
terrorists.”31  As some concluded in the Lords debate over the anti-terror bill, proscription 
is a valuable tool, but it should be handled with the greatest of care.32  Hizb ut-Tahrir 
perceives this discussion as a double threat to its existence.  For one, such a decision 
would drive the group underground in one of its last standing European strongholds, but 
of even higher interest, it would take away HT’s legal media and communication 
headquarters, from which it produces, publishes and distributes its whole print media and 
internet-based information material.   
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C. CENTRAL ASIA 
1. Central Asia33 
The historic development and presence of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the central Asian 
states can not be underestimated.  The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union 
in general created a stage of political and socio-economic uncertainty which the central 
Asian governments and their societies needed to balance.  The failed ideologies of 
socialism and communism left the lower class of society in particular with little to turn to.  
But even before that, the “cultural assault” by the Russians in the 1930s had already had 
deep effects in the central Asian populations by its elimination of all religious and Islamic 
affiliation in people’s everyday life.  Most of the Islamic movements had to go 
underground at that time while continuing efforts to stay present in the people’s minds.  
Subsequently, religious missionaries and associated Islamic ideologies filled the new 
vacuum that had been created as a consequence of the quick and broad changes to the 
region in the early 1990s.  “The number of mosques, madrassahs, and seminaries in 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan alone quadrupled in [the] first three years of 
independence…”34    
The governments throughout Central Asia did not undertake serious structural 
reforms after that enormous shock to the political and economic system.  Repressive 
regimes, massive unemployment, and rising crime rates led to increased poverty and a 
broad radicalization within the populations. At the same time, the increasing influence of 
“Western culture”, manifested in such areas as capitalism, free societies, and pop culture, 
gave the appearance of a morale decline in societal values, which groups and 
organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir intended to counterbalance with their Islamic 
ideology.   The group introduced an agenda of mainly three points that were 
exceptionally attractive to the region.  Firstly, it called for the return to Islamic values as 
the medication for the social illnesses and decline in Central Asia; secondly, it called for 
the reinstitution of sharia, an Islamic “just” law for society, once the party had seized 
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power; thirdly, in opposition to the extremist and violent Islamic group IMU, HT claimed 
to reject violence.  Its message was very popular, especially since the memory was still 
fresh for large parts of the population of all the violent upheavals, bloody ethnic clashes, 
and resulting grievances that took place in the late 1990s in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.  
The leadership of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asian states stems from an educated 
lower middle class, some with reasonable financial support; this must be put into context.  
The historical evolution had not given the region much time to develop economically, nor 
has it had great capacity to grow a broad entrepreneurship or middle-class society.  
Members of HT, however, are more difficult to analyze.  In Uzbekistan for example, the 
followers seem to be more educated, although only 8 per cent were business class, and 56 
per cent were unemployed.35  In Tajikistan, the mass consists of unemployed youth and a 
small number of students.  Surprisingly, the members in Tajikistan come largely out of a 
secular area, where HT manages to attract such a constituency by giving them hope 
through its Islamic ideology. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir uses a wide spectrum of activities to recruit members.  Leaflets and 
audio tapes, mostly provided by its British media centre in Asian languages, but also 
demonstrations in the streets or material and financial support for HT and non-HT 
prisoners show how versatile the group is in presenting itself.  According to information 
of the Embassy of Uzbekistan to the United Kingdom of Great Britain, the London based 
“Kiedat” (supreme legislative body of HT in UK) “gives orders to HT members to carry 
out various protest actions and anti-governmental demonstrations… [and also] 
propaganda materials of Kiedat are received by Internet in the Kyrgyz town of Osh, and 
then by use of floppy disk or piece of copies are forwarded…for subsequent duplication 
and spreading.”36  The distribution of Islamic literature of “HT’s brand” had some 
serious significance from early on in the Central Asian states.  The intention to influence 
education of children in schools and the distribution of material throughout the countries 
intend to achieve large-scale mobilization, which is viewed as necessary in order to enter 
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the second stage of “preparing its umma” for a subsequent takeover of governance.37  
The leaflets mostly discuss poverty, unemployment, migrations to Russia, land mines on 
Tajikistan’s border with Uzbekistan, government corruption, and other social grievances 
such as lack of gas and electricity throughout the region. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir intensified its efforts to achieve power in the Central Asian states 
by meeting with other extremist groups in 1997, among them the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) and the international terrorist network of Al-Qaeda.38  The IMU is 
known to be violent for its abduction of military personnel and government officials in 
the city of Osh in Kyrgyzstan, and the Tashkent bombing, both in 1999.  Their 
connections to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda go back to 2001, where IMU forces joined them 
in a combined effort against the U.S. led invasion in Afghanistan.39  There are various 
speculations about the intensity and modalities of the connections between HT, IMU, 
Taliban, and Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network; however, there seems to be no doubt 
that these ideologies have gotten together to promote further political change in the 
greater region of Central Asia, to include the areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.  In the 
worldwide combined effort to fight religiously motivated extremists and terrorism, all 
Central Asian states undertake serious measures to control the spread of HT’s ideology 
by imprisoning large numbers of HT members.  In Uzbekistan alone, an estimated 4,200 
followers of HT are in prison, in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan less than 200 members are 
being held and charged due to criminal activities.40     
2. South Asia 
HT has extended its sphere of influence over the Central Asian region and into 
South and Southeast Asia.  Repressive Central Asian regimes execute massive 
crackdowns since the mid 1990s on the party and it’s action, forcing members and 
existing structures  to deport south  into the neighboring  South Asian  states.  There were  
                                                 
37  Note: The methodology for seizing power will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
38  Embassy of Uzbekistan to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “Hizb ut-
Tahrir and Its Undermining Activity in Central Asia.” 
39  Baran, Islam’s Political Insurgency, p. 75. 
40  International Crisis Group, pp. 33-37. 
26 
traces of presence in Indonesia as early as 1983, and in reference to its own published 
“Global Dawah Map,” HT executes today demonstrations and other activities in Pakistan 
and in Bangladesh.41    
a. Presence in Bangladesh 
In 1992, Syed Golam Mowla, a teacher of Dhaka University went to Great 
Britain for a higher study on a Commonwealth scholarship.  During his stay on the 
British Island, he got in contact with members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and familiarized himself 
with the group’s ideology.  After his return to Bangladesh, Mowla began to hold study 
circles and meetings in which he was able to convince fellow Muslims that an 
organization such as Hizb ut-Tahrir would be able to improve the political, economic, 
and social conditions in Bangladesh.  “Then in 2001 [Mowla] organized a seminar titled 
‘Clash of civilization’ at Dhanmondi’s BETS Centre and through that Hizb ut-Tahrir 
Bangladesh chapter [had] formally emerged.42 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s formally announced its political interest in Bangladesh 
since the elections in 2001.  The group not just started to critique the current government, 
and especially the two main secular parties (Awami League [AL] and Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party [BNP]), but instead, it stated openly that this type of government 
(parliamentary democracy) is illegitimate and should be considered as an enemy of Islam 
and all Muslims.  Conventional elections just bring officials into power, but will not 
change things radically for Bangladesh, according to HT.   Instead, a caliphate that 
observes the rules and regulations of the sharia is to be established as a practical necessity 
and also as a religious obligation.  It is a practical necessity for the synergy effect of 
combining the manpower throughout the Muslim lands (considering the caliphate keeps 
expanding from the initial founding state), “with the money of Saudi Arabia, the 
agricultural  potential of Sudan,  and the Egyptian  expertise,  leading  [the caliphate]  to a  
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productive and successful economy.”43  But it is also a religious obligation for the reason 
of the necessary existence of “a pledge of allegiance” on the neck of every Muslim, 
accordingly, a caliphate with a legitimate caliph rendering such, has to be in place.44 
Hizb ut-Tahrir states that kufr (unbelievers) systems to include secularism, 
democracy, and capitalism control wide parts of Muslim lands to include Bangladesh.  
And especially in Bangladesh, these ideas are responsible for the uncontrolled crime, 
corruption, extreme inequality, and dependency on other nations.45   
The recruiting of members for the party takes mainly place in and around 
public and private universities.  Current members often address serious issues of 
globalization, imperialism, and economic systems in student discussions, in which the 
local level leadership is able to screen for future potential members.  The creation of an 
expanding membership is as much of interest as finding sympathizers in general.  Both 
will have a place in the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which needs the elite, educated, and 
well established (financial) leadership; but also the broad support from sympathizers in 
order to build the “critical mass support” for the final stage of seizing power.  Student 
unions and student political bodies are one of the loopholes HT uses as a legal means to 
operate on campus, after university authorities limited the group’s actions in prayer 
rooms, canteens, and study rooms.46   
Along with a crowd of 10,000 demonstrating Muslims, HT members 
continuously take the streets in Bangladesh to demonstrate against the European (and 
particularly the Danish) embassies in reference to the “Muhammad cartoons” that were 
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first printed in a Danish newspaper/magazine in September 2005.  Hizb ut-Tahrir’s media 
office in Line, Dhaka in Bangladesh asked in the follow-on press conference for the 
closure of the responsible embassies and the expelling of their ambassadors.47 At the 
same time, the spokesman announced three more demonstrations in Dhaka City, the 
National Mosque, and in the places of Chittagong, Sylhet, Khulna, and Rajshahi.  
Demonstrations are a constant phenomenon in Bangladesh, such as the one in January 
2006 against the plans for a future establishment of CIA bases in Bangladesh.  The group 
has its own website for Bangladesh, along with its official spokesman Mohiuddin 
Ahmed. The budget to run campaigns and produce distributive information is about Tk 
60,000 per month, which is provided by members and leaders of the group according to 
its own statement.48   Similar to its appearance in other countries, Hizb ut-Tahrir claims 
to be in opposition to the regional government; however, it emphasizes its non-violent 
operations, with no intentions to forcefully impose anything on the local population.   
b. Pakistan 
As far as the presence in Pakistan goes, HT is one of many Islamist groups 
in the region, with little ground to gain.  Organizations such as the Jamaat-i-Islami are 
stronger and have bigger constituencies while competing for the same target audience of 
educated classes.  As a non-sectarian group in a Shia minority region, HT has little 
chance to compete against the Jamaat-i-Islami.  The Jamaat-i-Islami has a political 
agenda that specifically focuses on socio-economic changes in Pakistani society in 
addition to its overarching goal to unite the umma.  The activities in Pakistan remain in 
large parts underground, and besides the official announcement of the group’s spokesman 
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III. THE WAY TO SUCCESS 
A. HIZB UT-TAHRIR’S IDEOLOGY 
Dear brothers and sisters, the vital issue for Muslims in the whole world is 
the re-establishment of the rule of Allah through establishing the Khilafah, 
and appointing a Khalifah for the Muslims, who is given the pledge on the 
Book of Allah and the traditions of His Prophet in order to demolish the 
rules of Kufr and to replace them with the laws of Islam both in 
implementation and application, to transfer the Muslim lands to Dar ul-
Islam (Land of Islam), to make the society in Muslim lands an Islamic 
society, and to carry the message of Islam to the world by invitation and 
Jihad.49 
Hizb ut-Tahrir claims to be a political party, one whose activities are politics and 
ideology is Islam.50  The group applied to become a political party in late 1952 in Jordan, 
but since the denial of that application by the Jordanian government at the time, HT has 
not participated in the regular political process.  Even the offer to compete in the 
elections of the Jordanian government in 1989 was refused by the leadership of HT for 
the reason of not respecting secular, non-Islamic elections.  According to HT, political 
parties are to be allowed in the Islamic state, but they have to be strictly Islamic and their 
task is to ensure the proper and legitimate ruling of the caliph as the head of the state.  
Democratic parties and elections as executed in the Western world are considered “kufr” 
and forbidden for Muslims.  In Western democracies, the people are the absolute master 
for the application of “ruling of the people, for the people by the legislation of the 
people.”51  The people are “masters over themselves” for guaranteeing each other the 
four freedoms of belief, opinion, ownership, and freedom.  Islam does not reserve these 
freedoms to the decision of humankind; they are solely the sovereignty of God and Islam 
itself, according to HT.  Hizb ut-Tahrir completely rejects the sovereignty of the 
individual, the people, or even the state, seeing sovereignty as the exclusive right of God.  
God alone is  sovereign, and worldly  governance is subordinate to the divine ruling.  The 
                                                 
49  Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change, p. 4. 
50  Ibid, p. 23. 
51  Hizb ut-Tahrir, Democracy is a system of kufr: It is forbidden to adopt, implement or call for it,”  
p. 6.  
30 
caliph is to be appointed to ensure the proper application of the sharia within the Islamic 
state. However, a separation between worldly matters and religious ones is not allowed; 
Islam is the sole and unified power with the primacy of God. 
The group believes that all the Muslim countries today are ruled by governments 
of kufr (unbelievers).  There are, according to HT, only a few states that impose Islamic 
ruling, such as Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Iran; however, that law is mostly applied to 
social or family issues and, therefore, the countries are in the viewpoint of the sharia still 
considered to be Dar-ul kufr (land of disbelief).  Dar-ul Islam (land of Islam) on the other 
hand, is defined as the “land that is governed by the laws of Islam and whose security 
(Aman) is maintained by the security of Islam, i.e. by the authority and protection of 
Muslims inside and outside the land, even if the majority of its inhabitants are non-
Muslims.”52  This definition emphasizes not the inhabitants that live in a country, but 
rather the laws and security (aman) that are present and applied by the ruler.  With this 
assessment, the acting ruler has to implement the sharia law and the “Islamic way of life” 
to ensure the two requirements of law and security.  Referencing the times of the Prophet 
Muhammad in the seventh century, HT argues that the best jihad is the word of truth 
spoken to an unjust ruler, while the use of material power and arms are legitimized only 
in the one case “where the ruler shows clear kufr, i.e. if he judged with the rules of kufr, 
or if he kept silent about the domination of kufr over the [Muslim] lands. In that case he 
should be fought against and arms should be raised against him.”53  This is in clear and 
open opposition to current Arab and Muslim regimes, who govern the majority of 
Muslims in the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and whom HT considers to be still 
subordinate to Western governance and dominance.   
The resurrection of the caliphate, re-establishment of the Islamic way of life, and 
spread of the word of Islam (i.e., carrying the Islamic Da’wah) by word and jihad are 
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Hizb ut-Tahrir’s aims.  All these objectives are strictly political and not spiritual, or 
educational, or organized with a welfare character as are other Islamist groups’ goals.54 
B. THE CALIPHATE 
1. Caliphate Structure 
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Figure 1.   Caliphate Structure 
 
 
The caliphate is a political system from the ideology of Islam that 
enshrines: the rule of law, representative government, accountability by 
the people through an independent judiciary and the principle of 
representative consultation.55 
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The head of this state is a caliph, elected by the citizens of the caliphate through 
the process of “baya.”56  It is a democratic election process, in which every citizen’s vote 
counts equally.  The ruler, once elected, is held responsible for running the state in the 
sense of the divine (i.e., Qur’an and Sunna) and according to the sharia.  As a servant of 
the people, he can be criticized and questioned, and an independent judiciary can remove 
him from power if he rules outside the boundaries of Islam.57  According to the 
“Proposed Constitution for the Islamic State” the caliph is “the state himself.”  He is 
responsible for foreign and domestic policies and also the leader of the Army.  He is 
bound to the legal rules derived by legal evidences, based on the Qur’an, the Sunna, the 
Companions’ consensus, or deduction by analogy (bi’ya and ijtihad).58   
The Department of the Jihad Commander oversees four sub-departments: the 
Department of External Affairs, Military Affairs, Internal Security, and Industry. In 
general, jihad training centers, military forces, police, and heavy industry for the 
production of war-time material are all under the centralized command of the Jihad 
Commander, who in turn is subordinated to the Caliph, the ultimate commander of the 
army.  According to HT, rules of engagement for fighting a jihad must be observed; they 
are framed in the proposed Constitution for an Islamic State. The notion and concept of 
Jihad will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
The power of this hierarchical structure is centralized in the person of the caliph.  
The House of Representatives has no real power in a legislative sense.  Its role is to 
advise the caliph; he uses the House of Representative only for consulting purposes.  The 
House of Representatives, furthermore, ensures the implementation of government 
policies within the capital and the provinces.   
The judiciary does have the authority to sentence anybody within the umma—to 
include the caliph--in the case of a proven offense.  The caliph has, therefore, no juristic 
immunity and could even be impeached and removed from office once proven guilty of 
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an offence.  The guideline of the presumption of innocence exists in an Islamic Court, 
and  the  onus is  on  the  plaintiff  to  provide  the  evidence.59   Generally,  the  proposed 
judiciary system is based on the primary sources of Islam (Qur’an and sunna), and the 
procedural framework for courts and judging is supported by multiple hadith of the 
Prophet Muhammad.   
For the rule of the Islamic state to become and remain effective, four principles 
must be implemented and maintained according to HT: 
1. The sovereignty belongs to the Shar’ia 
2. The authority belongs to the Ummah 
3. The appointment of one Khalifah 
4. The Khalifah alone reserves the right to adopt the Shar’ia rules (i.e., to 
enact them as laws). 
In the absence of one of the above, the ruling system becomes non-Islamic and 
loses its legitimacy.60   Hizb ut-Tahrir notices that there are many obstacles to putting the 
Islamic state into effect.  For one, there are many un-Islamic political and economic 
systems in the world, such as democracy, socialism, and capitalism.  These systems have 
infiltrated the Islamic world and societies.  They have corrupted Islamic thoughts in the 
Ummah and in its intelligentsia.  This is the most important obstacle that needs to be 
overcome in order to proceed.  The second obstacle is the presence of the current 
educational programs in the Muslim world, which were setup by the colonial powers.  
These structures are claimed to be responsible for the teaching of “misguided principles” 
that are demonstrated in such important everyday areas as administration, judiciary, 
government, and all teaching professions throughout Muslim lands.  These postcolonial 
structures need to be replaced in order for the Da’wah (message of Islam) to find its way 
to the Ummah.  Along with this education, a new generation of graduates in history, 
literature, philosophy and legislation is pre-programmed by the un-Islamic curricula to 
downplay the importance of Islam in solving the problems in their lives.  The goal is to 
differentiate these Western cultural aspects from their scientific facets with clear results.  
The benefits of Western culture are in dispute and the results inconclusive, according to 
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HT; therefore, it should not be allowed to run Muslims lives.61   In order to overcome 
these obstacles to the ultimate goal of an Islamic state, HT repeatedly stresses the 
importance of proceeding analogously to the Messenger of Allah.  Any deviation from 
the Prophet Muhammad’s actions would lead to a corruption of the Da’wah, and make it 
less possible to completely implement the Islamic way of life.  In practical terms, a single 
successful implementation in any country would be sufficient to resume the full task of 
spreading the message of Islam worldwide, according to HT.  The ultimate dream of one 
Islamic state “stretching from Spain in the west to China in the east and from Turkey in 
the north to Malaysia in the south, occupying the best parts in the world in terms of 
resources and strategic points…with a single correct ideology,” would give Islam the 
power to oppose every existing superpower in the world.62 
2. The Constitution for an Islamic State 
The Constitution for an Islamic state is an early construct of the group’s founder 
Taqim al-Din al-Nabhani.  Revisions of the original 1953 document have been 
undertaken, especially with Hizb ut-Tahrir’s proposal to the revolutionary leadership of 
the Iranian Revolution prior to 1979.   The constitution was derived by strict 
interpretation of Islamic legislative sources.  The Qur’an and the sunna built the 
foundation and reference for much of the procedural framework.  It contains 187 articles 
about the general rules, political system, social system, economic system, educational 
policies, and foreign policy of the caliphate.63   
The “General Rules” in section one of the constitution emphasize the importance 
and singularity of the Islamic doctrine and the domain of Islam.  Sovereignty is attributed 
to Islam and not to any leader or the society.  Rules and regulations are based on the 
Qur’an, the sunna, the consensus of the companions, and deduction by analogy (principle 
of bi’da and ijtihad).  The only exceptions are the notions of zakat and jihad, which are 
the sole responsibility of the caliph.  Non-Muslims within the Islamic state are permitted 
to worship in their own ways.  They are subject to the rules of the “dhimmies” (people of 
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contract) and have the rights of their faith, unless such rights conflict with the interests of 
the Islamic legal ruling, which then will have priority. 
The “Political System” in section two of the constitution confirms the centralized 
governmental structure and the sovereignty of Islamic law over the people.  The umma 
has the right to elect a caliph, who will stay in office for an undetermined amount of time.  
Death and judicial impeachment are the only means of replacing a caliph.  The umma is 
allowed to build political parties in accordance with Islamic law for the purpose of 
“calling the ruler to account.”  This is not to be understood as a political opposition, but 
rather as a monitoring or control function to ensure that the caliph rules in the sense of 
Islam.  The system foresees eight pillars for the governmental apparatus: Caliph, 
Authorized Aide, Executive Aide, Jihad Commander, Judiciary, Provincial Governors, 
State Departments, and Umma Council. 
The “Social System” is outlined in eight articles defining the relationship between 
men and women in the umma.  Men and women are granted the same rights and 
obligations “apart from those which Islam, through its legal evidences, has prescribed 
specifically for women or specifically for men.”64  The female role is considered to be 
primarily in the household as a wife and mother, although women are also allowed to 
participate in political issues and be employed by the state.  Husbands, on the other hand, 
have the obligation to protect their wives and families and are responsible for providing 
them with a respectable standard of living.  
The “Economic System” differentiates among three types of property rights: 
private, public, and state.  Produced wealth out of ownership belongs to God alone and 
the state ensures appropriate taxation, to include kharaj and jizyia payable by non-
Muslims.  Zakat is collected from all Muslims and is redistributed through funds to 
entitled members of the umma (i.e., poor, needy, wayfarer).  In this context, the state 
guarantees the well being of every member of the umma through this circulation of funds.  
Agriculture, industry, trade, foreign trade, and booty are means to raise income for the 
Islamic state, income that is to be funneled through the one allowed bank–the State Bank. 
The currency would consist of gold and silver only. 
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The “Educational Policy” ensures that all methods and objectives of instruction 
are in accordance with Islamic doctrine.  The state provides the central educational 
curriculum  in order to  foster Islamic  personalities, resulting  in knowledge  and learning 
“associated with Islamic life’s affairs.”  Technical disciplines and vocational skills are 
not rejected unless they contradict the Islamic point of view (i.e., painting and arts) with 
influences from cultures other than the Islamic. 
The last section in the “Proposed Constitution for an Islamic State” deals with the 
“Foreign Policy” of the Islamic state.  “[T]he foreign policy of the Islamic state is to 
convey the Islamic Message to the world…which is implemented by the defined method 
which never changes…jihad.”65  This overarching statement is documented in article 183 
in the constitution.  Other nation states can be in treaty with the Islamic state based on 
economic, trade or cultural agreements, but “states such as England, America, and France 
that practice colonialism, and states which have ambitions in our lands, such as Russia, 
are regarded as states which legally speaking are at war [with the Islamic state].”66      
C. HIZB UT-TAHRIR’S METHODOLOGY 
Hizb ut-Tahrir limited itself to proceeding strictly in accordance with the “divine 
rules.”  This means that HT refers to the primary sources of Islam and backs its actions 
and plans with suras and verses from the Qur’an, or by deeds and sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad.   By following the example of the Prophet, HT believes it can change the 
Islamic lands into Dar al-Islam and re-establish the Islamic way of life in the Islamic 
countries.  The Prophet changed the “jahiliyya” (stage of ignorance and barbarism 
associated with pre-Islamic tribes) society in Mecca was changed through this exact 
method.  By proclaiming the divine Islamic way as the only acceptable path, HT 
renounces everything else as kufr (disbelief).   
The party… considers all religions other than Islam, like Judaism, 
Christianity, and all ideologies, like Communism, Socialism, and 
Capitalism as kufr religions and kufr ideologies; and it considers the Jews 
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and Christians as kuffar (disbelievers), and whoever believes in 
Capitalism, Socialism or Communism as a kafr (unbeliever).67 
In order to create this Islamic society with strict Islamic values, HT established a 
three-step methodology for change.  The first step is considered to be the stage of 
culturing.  This step is exceptionally important as the vanguard of the political party and 
the party culture that is to be created.  This group will be capable of carrying out the 
political ideas.  Al-Nabhani stressed the “culturing” of those who wish to become 
members of the party, in order to have them make effective contact with society for 
further interaction.  He does not consider this as schooling in the conservative sense; 
rather, it is more practical to steer the society in “progressive moves,” which can only be 
achieved through means of the party.  A school would influence an individual, who 
would work to change society, while a party changes the society first, which will then 
change the individual.  The presence of the party concept itself must be central in the 
culturing curriculum, as the party carries the ideology.  For Al-Nabhani, the lack of idea 
crystallization, the absence of a method to implement ideas, and the dependence on 
persons without sound awareness (i.e., those who were driven by desire and zeal) were 
the three primary reasons why all previously known Islamic movements have failed 
throughout history.68  
The second stage encompasses the interaction with the umma.  The transition 
from the culturing stage to the interaction phase has to happen naturally.  This means that 
entering the second stage without having successfully completed the first stage is not 
possible.  Entering the second stage is, therefore, evidence of the soundness in the 
structure of the party and the collective readiness to interact with the umma.  The 
embodiment of the ideology, in the persons of the party members, enables the party to 
address the umma as a whole.  This is a very critical point, as this stage will create the 
mass support in the society.  “Islam would [then] be the inner sensation of the Ummah, 
and the party would be expressive of this sensation…[T]he Ummah would quickly 
understand the ideology and would interact with the party; hence the whole Ummah 
would be considered as the party and the select group would carry the leadership of the 
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movement through the party structure.”69  The means by which HT will convince the 
society are lessons in mosques, leaflets, magazines, public meetings and conferences, and 
also   the   use   of   the  internet, with   professionally  equipped   homepages   in  various 
languages.  This mass support of the umma is a pre-requisite to enhance the struggle 
against those things standing between the umma and the implementation of the ideology 
of HT.   
The third stage is the phase of assumption of government and seizure of power.  
The Islamic ideology will be put in place, and the message of Islam will be carried 
worldwide by the umma.  This implementation of Islamic ideology needs to be “radical” 
in the sense of a revolutionary change that does not accept gradual changes through 
society (the method advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood, for example).  A decisive 
difference in stage three compared to stage one and two is the action of seeking nusrah 
(help) for two reasons.70 First, sufficient protection is needed by the party to continue 
carrying the message of Islam and second, nusrah will be needed to “reach the 
government, so as to establish the Khilafah and bring back the rule of Allah in life, the 
state, and society.”71   
The underlying concept of all three phases is carrying the da’wah–the message of 
Islam.  Hizb ut-Tahrir makes many references to the proceedings of the Prophet 
Muhammad in the seventh century.  While in Mecca, the Prophet restricted himself to 
da’wah alone; physical force was only used later, after the migration to Medina.  In the 
initial stage of da’wah, the Prophet called and cultured people individually to Islam.  
They met in concealed places and worshipped discreetly until the word eventually spread.   
Then, he addressed groups and individuals with the word of God to convert larger parts 
of the Qurayish tribe.  With the death of Abu Talib, Muhammad lost protection and 
suffered persecution.  The Qurayish opposed the da’wah with torture, internal and 
external propaganda, and boycott.  As a consequence, Muhammad had to flee Mecca and 
sought protection for himself and his da’wah in Medina, using the concept of nusrah.   
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Although stages one and two are described by HT in detailed plans, little 
information is published for the “radical change” in the sociopolitical system in stage 
three.  The notion of seeking nusrah in order to increase the chances of success is 
addressed, though how this help will be used is not further specified.  Hizb ut-Tahrir is 
currently considered to be in the second stage.  It addresses the societies in order to create 
broad support for its Islamic message, although its status is widely discussed and varies 
from nation to nation. The group is proscribed in many countries throughout the three 
main regions of presence (Asia, Middle East, and Europe), though it is known to be 
continuing its activities, often in a clandestine manner. 
D. GROUP STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP 
1. Party Structure 
Hizb ut-Tahrir is organized in a rigidly centralized and hierarchical manner.  At 
the top is the commanding level, consisting of the “leadership committee” and the amir as 
the leader.  This level is able to oversee the whole organization throughout the regions.  It 
communicates downstream with the executive levels—also known as “provincial 
committees”--with the required guidelines for the execution of the agenda.  Each 
‘province’ at the provincial level equates to an individual nation-state and is led by the 
respective provincial committee, usually composed of about five to ten members. This 
provincial committee gives instructions further down to the local committee, usually 
consisting of four members.  This local committee represents the organizational tool for 
the local level or urban centers.  Study circles, meetings, and activities are planned and 
tasked to the “mushrif” (leader in the local level) in the individual villages.  The 
organizational structure reaches the personal level with study circles and direct contact 
with individuals and prospective members.  Study circles of about five members are used 
for in-depth screening of novices, their training, and of course for the indoctrination in 
HT’s ideology.72   
The party structure shows similarities to the proposed caliphate.  The central 
leadership in the form of the “amir” passes directions and orders vertically through the 
command tree, while confirmation and action reports flow upward along the same line in 
return.  The leadership oversees the ‘big picture’ and standardizes much of the 
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proceedings.  This is exceptionally transparent in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s use of the modern 
communication tool--the Internet.  The various web pages in the countries of legal 
presence show standardized, high-quality informational material that is mostly published 
in Arabic, English, and the regional/local language for whichever country the site is 
optimized.  Books produced by Khalifah Publications in London, Great Britain, can be 
openly accessed and downloaded by any interested audience.  These publications reflect 
the ideology, methodology and standard reference works for a global synchronized 
“schooling.”  The provincial committee, as the responsible level in the respective state, 
will act in accordance with the central leadership’s guidelines; however, it will 
implement the conditions and requirements while adapting them to the particular 
circumstances within that country.  Again, the example of the web-based information 
shows that the digital leaflets that are published regularly (where allowed) deal primarily 
with the problems of the region.  Political suppression, unemployment, crime, and the 
inabilities of a state to deliver social goods and services to its population are common 
topics and issues addressed at the provincial level.  These matters do have major 
influence on the recruiting policy and target groups at the local level, as complex social 
and economic conditions drive attitudes and actions within societies.  Perceived 
grievances on the local level make the societies vulnerable to idealistic solutions.  The 
local level represents the working level.  Distribution of informational material (in the 
form of paper leaflets) in urban centers and local mosques, one-on-one recruiting on 
campuses and local facilities, and the holding of study circles, meetings and conferences 
comprise the activities on the base level.   
2. Recruiting Structure and Membership 
The party accepts Muslim men and women as its members regardless of 
whether they are Arab or non-Arab, white or colored, since it is a party for 
all Muslims.  It invites all Muslims to carry Islam and adopt its systems 
regardless of their nationalities, colors or madhahib (Schools of Thought), 
as it looks to all of them according to the viewpoint of Islam.73 
Despite the global and overarching equality in the recruiting policy, local 
recruiting of members seems to be heavily influenced by the region in which the party is 
                                                 
73 Hizb ut-Tahrir, available at http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/english.html [last accessed 30 
March 2006]. 
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acting.  In Central Asia, for example, socially vulnerable people, to include unemployed, 
pensioners, young students, and single mothers, are the prime target group within the 
society.  However, people from the local bureaucracies and law-enforcement services are 
also welcomed by the organization, as they have access to sensitive information and are 
capable of safeguarding or protecting party activities.74    In Europe, and especially in 
Great Britain, HT tends to attract more-educated, lower-to-middle-class people.  Students 
from colleges and universities, but also lawyers, doctors, and other men and women with 
reputable professions, have become followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the past.  Still, the 
majority of members will come from the socio-economically underprivileged, who are 
often victims of racial discrimination and unemployment.  These grievances and the 
unsuccessful societal integration make many young British Muslims susceptible to the 
ideology of HT that advocates the caliphate as the solution to all problems.  Hizb ut-
Tahrir is making a serious effort to try to reach each and every Muslim within Britain.  
The International Khilafah Conference held in 1994 was--with 7,000 attendants--an 
indication of how serious Hizb ut-Tahrir is in getting its message across.  International 
Muslim leaders and intellectuals used the opportunity of freedom of speech to 
continuously spread radical rhetoric about the “unbelievers’” systems of governance and 
the illegitimacy of the state of Israel.75    Hizb ut-Tahrir used to publish a political 
magazine named “Explizit” in Germany prior to the group’s outlawing in 2003.  The 
Summer 2000 issue addresses “all Muslims living in the Western world” by stating that it 
is specifically their responsibility to stand up for the Islamic system of governance, and 
that it is un-Islamic to blend into the regional systems and regulations.76    
In general, Hizb ut-Tahrir employs a twofold recruiting policy.  It addresses all 
Muslims independent of race, nationality, or ethnicity.  The educated, integrated and 
successful Muslim is needed to support the organization in structural matters.  
Distributive print media, internet presence, and various meetings and conferences require 
a sustainable budget that is well-funded through its activities and donations by the 
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group’s members.77  As a consequence of such, wealthy and well-established Muslims 
are the potential donors and standard-bearers for the respectability of Hizb ut-Tahrir.  The 
lower class, unemployed, and socially unintegrated younger Muslim of contemporary 
societies is recruited to build numbers and drive the mass support that is needed for the 
ideology to take off in Muslim societies worldwide.   
Hizb ut-Tahrir makes full use of the internet to spread its ideology.  Various web 
pages can be accessed in multiple countries and languages--all designed to target the full 
spectrum of Muslims.  Intellectual, highly critical, and challenging texts and books are 
offered as “enlightening” documents for the well-established Muslim in the “imperialistic 
Western world.”  This material discusses the problem of the Muslim population 
worldwide on the basis of ideological concepts, and offers a methodology of Islam in 
accordance with the primary sources of Islam.  The online magazines and leaflets, on the 
other hand, deal with the day-to-day problems of Muslims in their regional environments.  
The content is highly propagandistic and often deepens the wounds of a hurt and 
disadvantaged portion of the population by demonstrating to them their “inferiority and 
helplessness” to their current regimes.  Slogans and headers such as “Reestablishing the 
Khilafah State is the Only Way to Free Ourselves from the Oppression of the Western 
Colonial Powers,” or “Islam is the Only Permanent Solution to Crime & Corruption in 
Society” are designed to give the audience no other valid solution than Hizb ut-Tahrir’s 
Islamic ideal.78  Aggrieved Muslims are supposed to get fired up against the supposed 
global propaganda campaign to prevent Muslims from adopting Islam.  Many of these 
arguments are only able to grab hold of the already vulnerable and susceptible person, 
due to their extremely biased terminology.  Last but not least, the internet presence 
exceeds the strict Islamic phraseology by offering music- and game-related sites, and also 
forums and chat groups for adolescents.  Although the front pages of these sites often do 
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78  Note: The slogans were headlines in Bangladeshi leaflets issued by Hizb ut-Tahrir’s media office at 
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not show the name of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a deeper look into the subsidiary pages will reveal 
the secret of the ideology behind them.79   
An online database search (http://haganah.org.il/jihadi/HuT.html) on Hizb ut-
Tahrir indicates more than twenty worldwide internet addresses, by which Hizb ut-Tahrir 
maintains its presence with books, digital leaflets, online journals and records about 
regional and local activities, to include peaceful demonstrations and Islamic conferences.  
Individual countries’ regulations and restrictions often force the party to alter the web 
addresses and registrations, most of which are through European, Canadian and 
American providers. 
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A. HISTORICAL APPROACH TO JIHAD 
Hizb ut-Tahrir emphasizes in all its publications the practice of jihad.  The group 
advocates waging jihad to seize power, but with the emphasis on non-violent methods.  
Once in power, it is not clear if and how jihad will be used to spread the message of 
Islam, which is one of the main obligations of all Muslims.80  Jihad is a core element of 
Islam and, therefore, a very important concept.  The Qur’an contains references to both 
militant jihad and the “internal struggle/jihad” of a Muslim. In the seventh century, the 
Prophet Muhammad established the first Islamic state in Medina by peaceful means; 
thereafter, he embarked upon a stage of jihad that was more violent and militant in order 
to spread Islam over the heartland of the Arabian Peninsula.   
Hizb ut-Tahrir refers to the early period of Islam without clearly stating its own 
intentions after the ultimate achievement of the caliphate.  The group announces--in its 
proposed Constitution for an Islamic State--that its foreign relations with states such as 
England, America, France, and Russia are considered as “at war.”81  However, as a high-
level “mushrif” of HuT-Uzbekistan publicly stated: “Hizb ut-Tahrir wants a peaceful 
jihad that will be spread by explanation and conversion not by war.  But ultimately there 
will be war because the repression of the Central Asian states is so strong.”82  This 
statement was made in the regional Central Asian context; it raises serious concern about 
the overarching use of jihad, since Hizb ut-Tahrir faces serious crackdowns throughout 
Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and increasingly in Europe. 
The second relevant issue Hizb ut-Tahrir addresses is the rejection of “infidel” 
societies and “apostate” state regimes.  The organization opposes the current Arab 
regimes   in   the   Middle   East   and   accuses   them   of   blasphemy   for   the    limited 
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implementation of Islamic “sharia” law.  Notions such as democracy, liberty, and the 
sovereignty of states and human beings contradict the law of Islam, according to HT, for 
the only respected sovereignty for Muslims lays with God in tawhid.   
The third central issue in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s political agenda regards the state of 
Israel.  Israel and the Jewish population are considered to be the biggest evil and must 
eventually be fought in order to achieve the complete Islamization throughout the Arab 
and Muslim World.  “The only legally permissible encounter between Jews and Muslims 
is on the jihad battlefield.”83 
The Qur’an, as one primary source of Islam and the basis for Islamic law, is the 
authority for Muslims worldwide.  Its one-hundred-fourteen suras seek to give every 
Muslim a guideline for his existence in accordance with Islam.  The Qur’an is the word 
of God, revealed to and recited by Muhammad, later written down and distributed in a 
canonical form by his successors.  However, the absence of a central, earthly interpreting 
authority of Islam became reason for fragmentation among Muslims, and a variety of 
interpretations on various core issues of the Qur’an became widely dispersed and 
manifested.  The following historical review of the diverse authoritative interpretations of 
jihad is essential in order to adequately analyze the possible alternatives for Hizb ut-
Tahrir’s proceedings on jihad. 
1. The Early Centuries of Islam 
In 610 C.E., the first revelation of what later became the Qur’an was recited by 
the Angel Gabriel to Muhammad in a cave near Mecca.  The Prophet Muhammad, as the 
first Muslim, found followers from his close surroundings and gradually converted them.  
Among them were his wife Khadija and his close companions Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, 
and Ali.  The four companions became Muhammad’s sequential successors and are 
widely referred to as the “Rightly Guided” caliphs in the history of Islam.  The local 
community did not immediately follow Muhammad’s ideology, and soon he and his close 
companions were persecuted and had to flee.  They left Mecca and migrated to Yathrib, 
later renamed Medina. This event, the hijra, has had a tremendous impact on Muslims 
around the world and marked the start of the Islamic calendar in 622 C.E.  Muhammad 
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established a broader constituency of Islam and finally succeeded in founding the first 
Islamic state with rules and laws based on God’s words revealed to him--later to become 
documented into the Qur’an.   
The early community of Islam was, from that point on, exposed to regulations and 
guidelines from God, while the revelations to Muhammad continued until his death in 
632 C.E.  The final parts of the Qur’an had then to be collected.84  The revelations of 
God’s words were constantly recited by Muhammad, so his companions and the Islamic 
community (umma) were permanently confronted with the new religious, legal and social 
framework for Muslims.  Many of the Qur’an’s sura and verses deal with fighting, 
warfare, and defense of the Islamic community; therefore, the Qur’an became the first 
real legitimate source of jihad.   Fighting and wars were considered a normal state of life 
amongst pre-Islamic northern Arab tribes and were, therefore, regarded as lawful.85   
Active warfare and fighting have to be differentiated into an offensive and 
expansionist part on the one hand, and a defensive portion opposing the adversary’s 
aggression on the other hand.  The Qur’an offers reference and support for both 
alternatives.  Qur’an 2:190 states:  “And fight in the way of God with those who fight 
you, but aggress not: God loves not the aggressors,”86 and stresses the defensive notion 
of waging jihad only against aggressors.  However, the classic opposite example is 
expressed in verse 9:5:  “Then, when the sacred months are drawn away, slay the 
idolaters wherever you find them, and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for 
them at every place of ambush.”87  This verse clearly indicates an offensive and 
aggressive tone to initiate warfare against unbelievers.  Even scholars of modern times 
still discuss  the opposing nature  of these two verses,  and the majority of scholars  are in 
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favor of the supremacy of Quranic verse 9:5 over 2:190, based on the historical 
abrogation where, within the Arab tribes, the state of war was the state of nature, and 
therefore lawful as such.   
The enemies in every case were the “unbelievers,” a term that is used for both 
polytheists and the “People of the Book.”88  The Christians and Jews are considered 
People of the Book and had, throughout the history of Islam, a somewhat protected 
status.  They were to be kept (when conquered) as dhimmies, and had the option of 
making a “tax payment” to the Muslims to escape mandatory conversion, while accepting 
various legal disadvantages.89  Submission or payment of tribute was an option for Jews 
and Christians and is mentioned in the Qur’an in sura 9:29: “Fight those who believe not 
in God and the Last Day and do not forbid what God and his Messenger have forbidden-
such men as practice not the religion of truth, being of those who have been given the 
Book-until they pay the tribute out of hand and have been humbled.”90 
The doctrine of jihad serves several functions.  One is to mobilize and motivate 
Muslims to participate in fighting, and to take over responsibilities as an individual 
believer of the umma.  Secondly, waging jihad has been one of the main tasks for a caliph 
and became a tool for legitimacy for him as a ruler.  A good ruler had to make continuous 
efforts in waging jihad to underline the spirit of spreading the “word of God,” or Islam in 
general.  Thirdly, the doctrine provides the framework and rules about fighting and the 
relationship with the enemy, specifically the treatment of combatants, civilians, women, 
elderly and children, but also the prerequisites for war and the conditions for truce in. 91  
The Qur’an  supports Islamic warfare by  Muslims.  God was on the side of the believers,  
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and even defeats of the Muslim army, in the early years of Islam’s existence, were 
commonly explained as the “reinforcement of the unity” of the umma, with the intent to 
make it stronger in the end.92   
But fighting is not the only definition of jihad. “To strive” in a spiritual and 
religious sense is another interpretation, which has evolved progressively with the 
common acceptance of the ahadith as an authority and another primary source of Islam.  
The ahadith encompass mainly the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, but 
also of his companions.  They are a collection of narrations about the ideal “Muslim way 
of life,” and build the framework for the Sunna.    
The Qur’an provides a basis for the spiritual meaning of jihad, i.e., “to strive,” as 
verse 22:78 articulates: “And strive (jahidu) for Allah as you ought to strive (haqq 
jihadihi). He elected you and did not impose upon you any hardship in religion-the faith 
of your father Abraham. He called you Muslims before and in this that the Apostle may 
bear witness against you and you may be witness against mankind. So, perform the 
prayer, give the alms and hold fast to Allah. He is your Master; and what a blessed 
Master and a blessed Supporter!”93 
But also ahadith can be used to underline the spiritual nature of jihad.  One of the 
most representative hadith in this context is from the collection of al-Mubarak’s “Kitab 
al-jihad.”  This hadith introduces three central figures in Islam; the “True Believer,” the 
“Sinning but Repentant Believer,” and the “Hypocritical Believer.”  These three figures 
are the central elements for judging and categorizing Muslims, especially in categorizing 
Muslim rulers, an important point which will be covered later in the essay.   
“The slain [in jihad] are three [types of] men: a believer, who struggles with 
himself and his possessions in the path of God, such that when he meets the enemy [in 
battle] he fights them until he is killed. This martyr [shahid] is tested, [and] the camp of 
God [is] under his throne; the prophets do not exceed him [in merit] except by the level 
of prophecy.  [Then] a believer, committing offenses and sins against himself, who 
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struggles with himself and his possessions in the path of God, such that when he meets 
the enemy [in battle] he fights until he is killed.  This cleansing wipes away his offenses 
and his sins-behold the sword wipes [away] sins!--and he will be let into heaven from 
whatever gate he wishes… [Then] a hypocrite, who struggles with himself and his 
possessions in the path of God, such that when he meets the enemy [in battle] he fights 
until he is killed.   This [man] is in hell since the sword does not wipe away hypocrisy.”94 
Both primary sources of Islam (the Qur’an and the Sunna) indicate the notion of 
two separate types of jihad.  Most literature addresses the mental or spiritual jihad as the 
“greater jihad” and the actual fighting or warfare as the “lesser jihad”.  Another hadith 
from the above mentioned “Kitab al-jihad” supports the distinction as follows: 
“A number of fighters came to the Messenger of Allah, and he said: “You have 
done well in coming from the ‘lesser jihad’ to the ‘greater jihad’.” They said: “What is 
the ‘greater jihad’?  He said: “For the servant [of God] to fight his passions.” 
The Qur’an and the Sunna laid out the foundation for the legal doctrine of jihad.  
Scholars and legal experts from the Muslim world (and later even from the West) started 
to argue about the various possible interpretations, while taking hundreds of verses from 
the Qur’an and reliable and authentic ahadith into account.95  
The notion of jihad appeared to “change” its meaning as history took its course.  
The earliest interpretations of jihad took place during the lifetime of Muhammad.  The 
persecution of the early Muslims in Mecca, followed by the hijjra, the building of the 
first Islamic state in Medina, and the return to Mecca were all events in and around the 
Hijaz.  They were limited in radius and dealt mainly with the “self-defense” of Islam as 
the new religion and faith progressed to build a wider constituency.  The follow-on 
centuries under the reign of the early caliphs experienced a different environment.  Islam 
became established on most parts of the Arabian Peninsula, and under the third caliph 
Uthman, the “expansion of Islam” gained on importance.  “Damascus was captured by 
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635 C.E., parts of Egypt were occupied by 641 C.E., and by the time of Mu’awiyah’s 
reign in the Umayyad dynasty, the western campaign against the Byzantine and Berber 
resistance had reached present-day Tunisia.”96 Expansionism brought many new aspects 
to the topic of jihad, as the radius of action increased and the lands of Arab tribes were 
left beyond.  How to deal with Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and people of other faiths 
in general?  What to do with women, children and elderly people during active warfare? 
What to do after fighting stops and new territory is conquered? 
These and other important questions had to be answered in the evolution of 
Islamic history.  The reference and basic foundation was present: the Qur’an and the 
Sunna, but the interpretation and implementation of both had varied with the opinions of 
jurists and legal experts throughout the centuries. 
2. Muslim or Muslim?  A Question of Quality 
Ibn Taymiyyah was a scholar of Islamic law (Hanbali School) and theology.  He 
lived in one of the most disruptive Islamic periods in which the Abbasid Empire was 
defeated by the invasion of the Mongols in 1258.  This situation forced Taymiyyah to flee 
Baghdad for Damascus. The consequences of the defeat of the caliphate, and also the 
implications for Islam as a whole, impacted his thinking tremendously.  Islam seemed to 
have lost its glory, which ultimately needed to be restored again.  Taymiyyah was 
convinced that the purity of seventh century Islam was necessary to reform and renew the 
Islamic society of the thirteenth century.  His approach was very conservative.   The 
Qur’an and the Sunna were the foundations and gave an exemplary model for the life of a 
Muslim.  Further, these doctrines also built the framework for the Islamic law--the 
sharia.  Ruling over Muslims was to become a sensitive point for the occupying 
Mongols.  They converted to Islam, but the law on which their ruling was based on still 
followed the Yasa code of law from Genghis Khan.  This fact was unacceptable for Ibn 
Taymiyyah.  He issued a fatwa against the Mongol rulers, who were considered “kafirs,” 
or unbelievers.   A Muslim ruler, who purposely does not implement Islamic law on 
Muslim soil was considered an apostate, and therefore an object to wage jihad against.97   
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Ibn Taymiyyah held the Qur’an verses 2:193 and 8:39 as the basis for his 
decision.  There, it is stated that unbelievers must be fought “until there is no persecution 
and the religion is God’s entirely.”98  In order to permit and motivate Muslims against the 
Mongol rulers, Taymiyyah referred to a series of Qur’an verses (Q. 22:39 [“Leave is 
given to those who fight because they were wronged--surely God is able to help them--
who were expelled from their habitations without right,..”] and  Q. 2:216 [“Prescribed for 
you is fighting, though it be hateful to you. Yet it may happen that you will hate a thing 
which is better for you…”]). 
Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwa of the late thirteenth century set the precedent in giving 
Muslims the right to wage jihad against their rulers under certain preconditions.  The 
legitimacy was constructed by using the main authority of Islam, the Qur’an.  The 
decision to call the Mongol Muslim rulers unbelievers, however, was an interpretation 
based on the fact that the sharia was not implemented by these rulers for Islamic 
governance.  Furthermore, it was for the first time that the quality of a Muslim was 
rated.99  It was not just about being a Muslim, or a Christian; although the Mongols were 
Muslims; Taymiyyah stressed that their loyalty went to a greater Mongol state and the 
sole fact of them being Muslims was not sufficient anymore.  This series of controversies 
was introduced by Taymiyyah for the first time in Islamic history.  
3. Islam – A Matter of Purity? 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (b. 1703 / d.1766) tried to set what is probably the most 
restrictive and conservative pace for Islam.  His ideology and interpretation of Islam is 
still unique today (besides the Salafi’), an extreme ideology centered on tawhid.100  
Although it is controversial as to what the sources of Wahhab’s thoughts exactly were, it 
is assumed that parts of his inspirations root in a “standard work of Hanbalite law dating 
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from the sixteenth century, the Iqna’ of Hujawi (d.1560).”101  Also, two famous scholars, 
Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, are frequently noted in al-Wahhab’s 
writings.  Ibn Taymiyyah relied fundamentally on the Qur’an and the Sunna, but did not 
insist on any particular form of rule and order, as long as the leader and ruler were bound 
to the sharia.  Al-Wahhab was different.  He insisted on the Qur’an, Sunna, and the Sunni 
legal positions from the first three centuries (Hanbali madhhab) in its purest form.  
Wahhabi’s (as followers of al-Wahhab) rejected any kind of idolatry, Sufism, and even 
Shi’ism as heresy and bid’a, which needed to be eliminated from Arabia.  Al-Wahhab 
became linked with Ibn Saud, with whom he shared the powerbase in what was later to 
become Saudi Arabia.  Saud served as the political leader and al-Wahhab provided the 
ideological and religious leadership.   
In 1746, the “Wahhabi-Saud state” declared jihad against other Muslims, using 
takfir (declaring a Muslim as non-Muslim or unbeliever).   They occupied and destroyed 
Karbala and its holiest sites; then they invaded Mecca and Medina in the early nineteenth 
century, demolishing holy Sufi places, cemeteries, tombs and anything they associated 
with any type of shirk.102  The obsession to “purify” (tawhid) in the strict sense of 
Wahhabism is not legitimated in any of the authoritative sources of Islam, which the 
Wahhabis so highly embrace.  The use of jihad against Sufis and Shia, calling them 
unbelievers and destroying Muslim holy sites shows how they attempted to justify their 
jihad--by fighting unbelievers.  However, the basis for declaring Shia and Sufi to be 
unbelievers is not integral to any of the authoritative sources of Islam at all.  
4. The Pioneers of Islamic Revival103 
The early twentieth century certainly brought the most interesting changes in 
Islamic history.104  The diverse political, economic and social environments at the 
                                                 
101  Quote is taken from Michael Cook, “On the Origins of Wahhabism” in Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, 3rd series, 2.2 (July, 1992), pp. 191-202.  
102  Note: Shirk is commonly referred to as anything associated with God; or any type of idolatry. 
103  Note: This is title of a book edited by Ali Rahnema from Zed Books Ltd, London and New Jersey 
from 1994. 
104  Note: For the purpose of this paper, the Islamic history in this chapter is geographically associated 
with the Middle East and closest surrounding (eastern parts of North Africa, and also Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and India in the east). 
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beginning of the 1900s gave reason for many Islamic scholars and thinkers to critique and 
rethink the status quo of Islam.  Subordination to the colonial powers and the continuous 
interdependencies of “the  new  independent”  Arab  states  in  the  postcolonial   period 
created frustration throughout the region.  The goal for many early reformers such as al-
Afghani or Muhammad Abduh was to find a golden formula in order to re-establish a 
united umma in the successful format of the seventh century Islamic society.   
But Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb also became major ideological 
figures for Islamic movements and were convinced of the fact that maktab was capable of 
issuing practical solutions to problems emerging in the modern world.105  They identified 
four primary causes for the plight of Muslims: the erosion of Islamic values, the 
collaboration with non-Islamic governments, the corruption of the ruling classes, and 
their ongoing dependence on the non-Islamic and imperialistic powers.106 Despite the 
dissatisfaction with regimes and societies, the ideologues approach was mental and 
spiritual rather than violent (at least in the beginning).   
Sayyid Qutb expresses, in his very controversial book Milestones, his aversion to 
the “jahiliyya.”107   This Arabic term has generally been used to describe pre-Islamic 
societies exclusively for their barbaric behavior and ignorance.  Qutb extended the 
meaning of the term to include modern societies’--Muslim and non-Muslim alike--being 
in a state of ignorance of the divine.  “Jahiliyya…is one man’s lordship over another, and 
in this respect it is against the system of the universe and brings the involuntarily aspect 
of human life into conflict with its voluntary aspect.”108  Qutb purposely uses the 
expression for Muslim and non-Muslim societies alike, insisting that the Muslim society 
became tainted by way of un-Islamic thoughts. 
In this perspective, Qutb addresses the strategy for jihad on jahiliyya initially as 
spiritual and intellectual; an inner reconstruction, where the individual needs to acquaint 
                                                 
105  Note: ‘maktab’, translated as Islamic doctrine. 
106  Rahnema, p. 5. 
107  Note: Qutb uses the term ‘jahiliyya’ for non-Muslim societies, and for Muslim societies that 
became tainted by ways of un-Islamic thoughts. 
108  Qutb, p. 46. 
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himself with Islam.  The objective is to get Muslims, themselves, on the right path again; 
basically “re-Islamizing” them in their deeds and thoughts.  As soon as this has been 
achieved, jihad can be more aggressive and offensive, but Qutb asserts that it will not 
necessarily be coercive against non-Muslims.  Qutb clearly states that jihad has a 
worldwide dimension in order to spread the message of Islam, but Islam will leave it up 
to the people to accept or reject Islam.  The reference for his ideas is taken from Qur’an 
verse 2:256: “No compulsion is there in religion.” 
The differentiation between defensive and offensive jihad loses importance in 
Qutb’s writings.  He argues that the term “defensive” is used in defeatist and apologetic 
forms in contemporary Muslim works.   Jihad should be analyzed in its original 
condition, in which it prevailed.  The Meccan period, mostly described as the peaceful 
period of early Islam, has its roots in the fact that it was new and needed to be structured 
and organized first.  It was not the time to progress in an offensive manner.  The period in 
Medina was different since a larger united constituency, in the form of an umma, had 
already been created.  It was the first Islamic state, ruled with the divine “words of God.”  
It became the responsibility of Muslims to free the people who were ruled by humans 
with laws made by mankind.  The usurped authority of God needed to be reinstated, 
according to Qur’an verse 43:84:  “And it is He who in heaven is God and in earth is 
God; He is the All-wise, the All-knowing.”  As a result, this period is known to be more 
militant, bellicose and politicized. 
Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi was, in large part, carrying a similar message.  Islam 
was facing the challenge of “man-made tyranny,” when Islam should issue the call of 
freedom and liberation for humankind.  But Mawdudi, in contrast to Qutb, had a clear 
blueprint of how the Islamic state and regime should look.  He did not reject the notion of 
a state as such; however, the basis for such needed to be in accordance with the shariat.  
By emphasizing  Islamic  law, he committed  to the vision  of complete  justice more than 
other reformers at the time, so his approach on jihad was less oriented toward the total 
supremacy of Islam, and more toward unity and equality.  In this context, Mawdudi’s 
agenda can be categorized politically as a socialist and communist dogma.109 
                                                 
109  Cook, p. 100.  
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B. HIZB UT-TAHRIR AND JIHAD 
1. Hizb ut-Tahrir and Jihad 
The resurrection of the caliphate is an imperative for Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) and 
the major milestone among its multiple objectives.  The group strives to topple a regime 
by strictly intellectual and non-violent means, preferably in the Middle East, but not 
exclusively.  Latest expansions into Europe and Central Asia have proven how versatile 
and flexible HuT is--able to react in order to optimize its strategy and proceedings.  
Recent developments in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Turkmenistan) indicate the success of Hizb ut-Tahrir, especially in the under-developed 
areas with impoverished and mostly unemployed Muslim populations.  Although the 
resurrection of a caliphate is certainly not imminent at this time, the chances of their 
gaining enough support to claim a territory that would enable them to put in place a 
pseudo-regime, or in their words a caliph, is not improbable.  The increasing support for 
Islamic groups throughout the Middle East (Muslim Brotherhood-Egypt, Hamas-PA, 
Islamic regimes in Iran and Sudan) and the increasing trend to oppose Westernization in 
this region of the world is sufficient argument to hypothetically discuss the intentions of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir after they claim some sort of power. 
The notion of jihad is discussed in many of the group’s website publications.  
Although violence is repeatedly and strictly prohibited to seize power or topple a regime, 
little is given in the way of alternate strategies.  Hizb ut-Tahrir stresses its adherence to 
the Qur’an and hadith, which would, as argued in the first part of the essay, leave the 
group enough leeway in interpretation to wage jihad even in an offensive manner, as soon 
as a caliph is in place.  The absence of a caliph (or Imam for the Shia) is the limiting 
factor, according to primary Islamic sources, in waging an offensive jihad.  Jihad plays an 
exceptional role in the proposed “Constitution for the Islamic State,” issued by Hizb ut-
Tahrir in 1979.110  Articles 51 to 65 deal exclusively with the tasks of the Jihad 
Commander and the Caliph’s use of the Army.  A fixed command structure in the 
                                                 
110 Note: The original proposed constitution was drafted by the group’s founder Taqi al-Din al-
Nabhani in 1953.  Shortly prior to the events in Iran in 1979, HuT presented the future Iranian leadership an 
updated version with the suggestion of implementation (Mudhakkira min Hizb al-tahrir hawl al-Dustur al-
Irani) of this constitution. The group states that all constitution articles are derived by the process of ijtihad 
of legal evidences from Islamic primary sources.  
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“Department of the Jihad Commander,” and the published “Foreign Policy” (Articles 177 
to 187) indicate the emphasis of Jihad in the strategic framework of Hizb ut-Tahrir.111  
External Affairs, Military Affairs, Internal Security, and Industry departments are 
subordinated to the Department of Jihad.  Article 185 (iii) states that countries such as 
England, America, France, and Russia (states which practiced colonialism) are 
considered states with whom to be at war.112         
The evolutionary process of jihad interpretations throughout history has 
encountered various stepping stones.  God’s revealed words are the beginning of Islam 
and the foundation for the highest written authority of Islam – the Qur’an.   
Persecuted in the early seventh century, Muhammad and his growing constituency 
followed the divine orders primarily to defend their faith and belief, as it was born 
physically in the midst of two competing empires.  The Byzantines in the west and the 
Sasanians in the east were considered a potential threat to the pre-Islamic and nomadic 
Arab tribes in the Arabian Desert.113  The first generation Muslims, under the leadership 
of the Prophet Muhammad, expanded their sphere of influence and filled the political 
vacuum of the Arabian Peninsula until the Prophet died in 632 C.E. 
The real Islamic “expansion,” however, did not start until after Muhammad’s 
death.  The following decades and the century to come were structured by the Islamic 
conquests of the Umayyads and Abbasids.  Their conquests took them north into the 
Levant and into today’s Iraq, east into the Persian (Sasanian) empire, and finally, farther 
west into North Africa.114  The vast amount of collected material on the Prophet’s deeds 
and thoughts (ahadith) had obtained a major influence on the behavior of the Muslims.  
This vast amount of hadith needed to be controlled and examined for authenticity.  
Ahadith with bad isnads had to be sorted out.115 
                                                 
111  Note: For further details, see Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the 
Search for the Islamic Caliphate, Grey Seal London, GB, 1996, pp. 193-215. 
112  Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, p. 215. 
113  See Figure 1 for geographical depiction in the Appendix. 
114  See Figure 2 for geographical depiction in the Appendix. 
115  Note: ‘Isnad’ is translated as the connection of chain of transmitters of a given ‘hadith.’ 
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The legitimate Islamic documentation, in the form of Qur’an verses and ahadith, 
offer many references to jihad.  These references were based on either God’s words or on 
the Prophet Muhammad’s deeds, sayings, and thoughts.  Their use and practical 
application is similar to modern law, in which interpretations of written texts play a major 
role.  They do so because time and situation do matter, and the adaptation of sources to 
evolutionary processes must always be possible.   
The Umayyads and Abbasids waged jihad in the context of going to war, mainly 
for reasons of expansionism. They did not encourage conversions within the newly 
conquered territory, partly for the reason of raising the jizyah, a tax to be paid by the 
defeated non-Muslims that constituted a major source of revenue for the extended Islamic 
state.116  Ibn Taymiyyah’s interpretation was, for the first time in history, sufficient basis 
to attack Muslim rulers, because the Mongols, although Muslims, were not ruling in 
accordance with the sharia.  The Wahhabi way of reading the prerequisites was even 
more extreme by rating the quality of a Muslim, with the result of waging jihad against 
Muslims not adhering to the Wahhabi standard.  
Rules and regulations were applied to worldly matters that differed from those of 
the seventh-century Islamic world.  It became more and more evident that references 
from the Qur’an were taken out of original context and applied to situations in which the 
sole recitation of verses would serve as sufficient legitimation for intended action.  Jihad 
has been misused in order to motivate parts of the Muslim societies to be in favor of 
belligerent actions.  It has seemed to become convenient for Islamic fundamentalists and 
leaders of such groups to purposely use the religious framework to support their cruel and 
unjust intentions. 
The twentieth century calls from Sayyid Qutb for waging jihad to fight jahiliyya 
in non-Muslims societies, in Muslim rulers, and even in ordinary Muslim people who 
went “astray,” appeared to be intellectually and literally backed by the primary sources of 
Islam. The interpretations of the sources of Islam and the subsequent actions of radical 
Islamic groups are very different.  These belligerent ideologies usually do not follow a 
call for the intellectual and spiritual part of the jihad first; rather, they begin with violent 
                                                 
116  Cleveland, p. 15. 
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means, using random verses from the Qur’an taken out of context in support of their 
actions.  Overall, it should be observed that jihad, as a legitimate core element of Islam, 
has been widely misused to justify warfare actions under the umbrella of Islam.  It was 
(and even is) convenient to do so in order to persuade and motivate vulnerable elements 
of societies by making them believe that the action is carried out in the realm of the 
divine. 
The differentiation between “defensive” and “offensive” jihad has diminished 
over time, as the definitions of both can be stretched intellectually, as the following quote 
of Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi indicates: “If you want the truth, Islamic jihad is both 
offensive and defensive at the same time. It is offensive because the Islamic party 
opposes and confronts the systems founded upon the principles that are contrary to Islam, 
and desires to destroy their power-and does not shrink from the use of force in order to do 
so-and defensive because it is compelled to construct the building of the kingdom and to 
reinforce its foundations so as to make possible the work in accordance with its 
established program and plan.”117 
The various subjective interpretations of jihad through the centuries of Islamic 
history have built a foundation for extremist groups to pick-and-choose among arguments 
to justify warfare and violence under the umbrella of Islam.118  Although it is clear that 
Islam is neither more nor less belligerent than any other religion or civilization in the 
world, extremist groups are still able to recruit followers ready to carry out violence in 
the name and will of the divine.  Many of the groups do a selective search of 
endorsements in the primary sources of Islam in which to ground their arguments. 
It is difficult to say how Hizb ut-Tahrir will develop over time.  For now, the 
group proceeds officially with non-violent means; however, the latest developments in 
Central Asia give serious reason for concern.  The total HT membership amounts to 
20,000 just in Central Asia, with an estimated 5,000 members only in Kyrgyzstan’s 
                                                 
117  Cook, p. 101. 
118 Note: For graphic depiction on the historic evolution of jihad, see end of chapter. 
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ethnic Uzbek population.119  Uzbekistan’s assumed HT membership is even higher, 
considering that, according to official reports, approximately 5,000 HT members have 
already been arrested by Uzbek security forces, while in Tajikistan 118 additional 
members had been put in prison alone in 2005.120  Many of these are claimed to be 
responsible for criminal acts and activities against local laws and regulations.  
Furthermore, internal sources of Hizb ut-Tahrir stated ”that groups pledging the party 
their backup can use arms…if society stands against the regime its removal even by 
military force does not constitute an act of violence: this would be the case only if the 
party were to kill its opponents to arrive in power, for example.” 121  It finally will come 
down to the point of how to define violence.  Hizb ut-Tahrir, clearly opposing the U.S. 
interest in the Middle East and elsewhere, still rejects terrorist activities and violence in 
America or against civilians.122  So it seems that the group makes a distinction between 
violence against civilians and “toppling a regime” by “procession to the palace or 
presidential residence…through a military coup executed by forces that have agreed to 
hand over power to the movement.”123 
Finally it is concluded that the use of jihad, especially the offensive militant part, 
and also the use of violence and force is a matter of definition.  Depending on the group’s 
way of argument in the various political environments it is in, the rest of the world will 
have to keep a close eye on the development of its primary objective in seizing power.  
Should Hizb ut-Tahrir decide to apply the seventh-century model by building the Islamic 
state by peaceful means, the chances of toppling a regime are very low as of now.  
However, should they make use of more aggressive and militant splinter groups to  
 
 
                                                 
119 Note: Numbers based on the following U.S. government report, available at 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/65470.pdf [last accessed 24 May 2006]. 
120 Note: Number of jailed Hizb ut-Tahrir members comes out of the International Religious Freedom 
Report 2003, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/24443.htm [last accessed on 25 May 2006]. 
121  Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, p. 104. 
122  ICG interview, Dr. Imran Waheed, Hizb ut-Tahrir (UK) spokesperson, 5 June 2003, London. 
123  Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, p. 102. 
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support their actions in the concept of “nusrah,” a change in the strategic plan could 
evolve soon, since the pure intellectual struggle has not shown any results in the last five 
decades.124   
History has laid out a broad foundation for building arguments either way: to 
wage jihad in a spiritual, in a defensive, and in an offensive manner.  Interpretations are 
always affected by the circumstances under which they evolve; therefore, political 
environments in Central Asia and the Middle East provide sufficient aggressive energy, 
capabilities, and fertile grounds to misuse the noble concept of jihad solely for the self-
















                                                 
124  Note: Nusrah is translated as seeking outside assistance, based on the case of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s assistance from Arab tribes in his conquest of Medina. 
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V. THE STATUS QUO 
A. CURRENT INTERACTION WITH REGIONAL POLICIES 
1. Middle East 
The political organization and radical Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir has been 
banned throughout the Middle East since the early 1970s.  The Middle Eastern countries 
consider the group to be a threat to their national security, undermining the regional 
leadership with an overarching goal to overthrow a government and ultimately installing 
the caliphate.  The ban on the group and its activities forced the movement to go 
underground, with the consequence that over the last couple of decades very little reliable 
and unbiased information on the group’s structure and membership count can be 
documented.  Regional governments offer press releases on arrests and imprisonments of 
HT members on an irregular basis.  These records indicate, besides the group’s general 
presence in the area, that the charges pressed against HT members are mostly associated 
with criminal offenses.  Controversial messages were published in reference to an 
Egyptian government crackdown on radical Islamists belonging to Hizb ut-Tahrir in 
April 2002.  One Egyptian newspaper reported that over one hundred members of HT 
were arrested, while the state-run newspaper reported a count of fifty-four.  Hizb ut-
Tahrir’s media spokesman, Dr. Imran Waheed, stated from Great Britain that only three 
of the men were members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, and that these men were in Egypt for 
educational purposes only.  It was unclear what the charges against the men would be, 
although it is assumed that “the belonging to a clandestine and illegal organization with 
the goal of suspending the law and the constitution and preventing state institutions from 
accomplishing their goals” was reason enough to jail the accused.125  In Syria, the 
membership and all activities associated with HT are illegal, and the Syrian government 
arrested about eight hundred political opponents from Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and the pro-Iraqi Ba’th party, according to Amnesty International.126  The 
list of those arrested from Hizb ut-Tahrir in Syria (2002) includes fifty-nine people, most 
                                                 
125  Middle East Times, Summary of report, Egypt, 26 April 2002, available at 
www.westerndefense.org/articles/Egypt/may02.htm [last accessed 04 April 2006]. 
126  Amnesty International, available at http://t2web.amnesty.r3h.net/report2003/syr-summary-eng 
[last accessed 04 April 2006].  
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of whom are businessman, science graduates, or even government and military 
affiliates.127  Other countries, such as Jordan, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia report similar 
incidents, cases and numbers.   
The accusations against the group are diverse and manifold.  Illegal activities, 
criminal affiliations, the pursuing of state-undermining objectives, and even support of 
militant actions against rulers and governments cover the full spectrum of reproaches, 
although the evidence of such is elusive and sometimes hard to prove.  An open letter 
from Hizb ut-Tahrir to the Arab leadership represented in a meeting at Cairo in 2000 
exposes the extreme hatred against the American-Israeli relationship.  The letter openly 
calls for a rebellion and bloodshed against the “Jewish state” and the U.S. interest in the 
region, since the time is considered right.  The Arab governments were only emplaced as 
puppets and obstacles by the “colonial kufrs” to prevent the unification of the umma and 
the eventual waging of jihad, according to the HT author of the letter.128  
The majority of information about Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activities in the Middle East is 
either based on isolated government reports or Hizb ut-Tahrir’s own statements 
concerning the analysis of Middle East politics.  The group does not state any numbers 
for its presence in the Middle East; however, its radical and often hate-filled rhetoric 
against the U.S. and Western influence in the Arabian heartland leads to the conclusion 
that the Middle East remains the center of the party’s interest.  This coincides with HT’s 
primary goal of establishing a caliphate, preferably in a Muslim and Arab country, and 
the subsequent goal of the eradication of Israel by executing jihad.  The caliphate is the 
sina qua non for launching the battle, since only the caliph can call for “the liberation of 
the occupied land from Jewish entity.”129  The radical rhetoric is also targeted against the 
                                                 
127 Note: For complete listing of names, date of birth, and professions, see “The Syrian Committee for 
Human Rights” report. It is listed and published by Al-‘Adalah Issue No. 5 from October 2002.  The 
imprisoned are kept in the Saydana prison in Syria.  All were arrested shortly prior President Bashar’s 
coming to power in Syria. 
128  Hizb ut-Tahrir, “Offener Brief von Hizb ut-Tahrir an die an die in Kairo konferierenden 
arabischen Regenten,“ available at http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/deutsch/leaflets/HTlflts/ 
Offener_Brief_an_Gipfel_komplett.htm [last accessed 04 April 2006].  
129  Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflet, 01 July 1982; 09 October 1990; 10 February 1988.  See also leaflet from 25 
February 1998 for premises of “the declaration of jihad on the Jewish state on the creation of the Khilafah 
state.” 
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Arab regimes for supporting the interests of the U.S. and Europe in the Arab and Muslim 
lands.  Hizb ut-Tahrir only shows open presence in those countries where it is allowed or 
accepted.  In Lebanon, Turkey, Morocco, and Palestine activities such as leaflet 
distribution and street demonstrations can be noticed; in Iraq, for example, HT wrote an 
open letter to the National Assembly in early 2005 advising them to write a constitution 
whose source is the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of his Messenger, and “not the US 
occupation.”130   
The consequent ban throughout the Middle East, with the exception of a few 
states (Yemen, UAE, Lebanon), forced Hizb ut-Tahrir underground decades ago.  Only 
where accepted in “small doses” does HT indicate its presence and open opposition to the 
growing demands of liberty and democracy.  Although the group never admitted alliance 
or ideological entente with any terrorist groups, it is worth noting that the practical and 
tactical differences are bigger than the doctrinal ones.  Al-Qaeda and Hizb ut-Tahrir are 
both openly anti-secular, reject the boundaries and existence of modern nation-states, 
follow both a conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam and the divine guidance of the 
Prophet Muhammad, and reject any participation in the political and electoral process.  
The U.S. and European postcolonial influence in the sphere of the Middle East is 
considered by both organizations as the “evil in the region.”  Neither ideology is accepted 
in its originating region, nor allowed to openly outline its objectives and goals.  However, 
each differs in its respective ”means to the end”--at least for now. 
2. Europe 
Europe appears to be a different sphere of influence for Hizb ut-Tahrir.  The 
organization has enjoyed enough political leeway to address its ideology and 
methodology openly for many years throughout Europe.  Europe’s request for labor and 
workforce in the 1970s and 1980s opened the door to the beginning of a multi-cultural 
society, with Muslims migrating from the Balkans to the European states farther north (to 
include Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, France and the Netherlands).  However, the 
lack of social integration and limited absorption in the political and economic 
environment led to frustration and grievances on both sides.  Frustrated and unemployed                                                  
130 Hizb ut-Tahrir, “Khilafah Magazine International,” pp.20-21, available at 
http://www.khilafah.com/home/category.php?DocumentID=11791&TagID=24 [last accessed 15 March 
2006]. 
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parts of the European Muslim population had in the meantime to deal with reversed labor 
markets that required fewer unskilled laborers and subsequently demanded higher entry-
level qualifications.  For many of the Arabic- and Turkish-speaking immigrants the 
demand to develop inter-cultural competence in the form of linguistic adaptation and 
sociopolitical-system knowledge of modern European states and societies was often 
unrealizable.  It finally was left to the second- and now third-generation Muslims in 
Europe to either actively pursue the integration process, or pull back–and interact at a 
minimum with contemporary European societies.  Widened gaps between integration and 
isolation led increasingly to extreme and fundamentalist views of Islamic ideologies.  
Radicalism and extremism, mixed with violence, are implications of such a result, and are 
hard to control or to suffocate.  
The events of 11 September 2001 changed the procedural guidelines for fighting 
religiously motivated extremism and radicalism in many European countries.  Germany, 
Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain and other influential European states altered their 
judicial framework to tighten the belt around these extremists’ ideologies.  Along with 
those counter-measures came the loss of freedom to openly spread Hizb ut-Tahrir’s 
ideology .  States such as Germany and the Netherlands have proscribed HT within the 
last years.  Great Britain, however, seems to be the last major “safe haven” for Hizb ut-
Tahrir, although the discussions about the outlawing of HT is gaining traction within the 
British government.   
Great Britain is of exceptional importance for HT, since the group has its 
communications, and its de facto ideological, headquarter for the worldwide distribution 
of ideological information.  Khalifah Publications, the media center of Hizb ut-Tahrir, is 
located on Gloucester Road, in London, GB.  This center publishes all the books of HT 
and a majority of its digital leaflets, journals, and magazines, and also designs various 
websites affiliated with the group.  Hizb ut-Tahrir enjoys the exact four liberal, 






personal freedom--that it so categorically denounces as the “sovereignties derived by 
humans and responsible for the creed on which the capitalist ideology had been 
established.”131   
British Prime Minister (PM) Tony Blair introduced a four-point plan in July 2005 
with measures to increase national security.  New laws against incitement and instigation 
of terrorism, new measures to keep those who incite hatred out of the UK or to ease their 
deportation, helping the Muslim community to counter the “evil” interpretations of their 
faith, and international efforts to mobilize the moderate and true voice of Islam are 
advocated by the British PM as helpful measures, recommended by the police and 
security services in Great Britain.132 
Hizb ut-Tahrir realizes the political pressure against radical, anti-governmental 
ideologies.  Hizb ut-Tahrir claims that the British government and media use the 
aftermath of the July 2005 bombings in London “to sustain a climate of outrage towards 
the [Islamic] community, forcing them [Muslims] into a corner to concede their problems 
and conform to new reform measures.”133    Hizb ut-Tahrir calls for all Muslims to “not 
succumb” to silencing; instead, they should speak up and resist the “political and media 
attacks” for the “disgraceful admission” of the plan to mobilize “moderate and true 
Muslims” by the British government.  The group is convinced that it is an obligation of 
Islam to continuously work toward the establishment of the caliphate in order to stop 
wars and discontinue oppression in the Muslim lands. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s intention to draw attention away from the political conflict and 
move it into cultural and religious aspects can similarly be observed in Denmark.  
Denmark intended to proscribe HT in 2002 after a group official advocated slogans and 
flyers with anti-Semitic contents, couched in verses from the Qur’an to legitimize his 
calls.  In 2005, similar leaflets and propaganda material were distributed, calling for help 
                                                 
131  Hizb ut-Tahrir, Democracy is a system of Kufr: It is forbidden to adopt, implement or call for it 
(London, GB: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1995), pp.6-8, available at http://www.khilafah.com [last accessed 
23 March 2006].   
132  Note: For citation and complete documentation on House of Commons Hansard debate from 13 
July 2005 (one week after 07 July bombings in London), see http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/cm050713/debtext/50713-03.htm [last accessed 07 April 2006]. 
133  Khilafah Magazine International from August 2005, pp. 6-9. 
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to Muslims in Iraqi Falluja, to fight the American occupation and the regime; however, 
the group has still not been banned officially in Denmark to this day.134  In regard to the 
inflammatory published cartoon-pictures of the Prophet Muhammad in the “Jyllands-
Posten” in September 2005, Hizb ut-Tahrir argues that the Danes, and in the larger 
context the Europeans, were well aware of what the reactions to, and implications of, 
these cartoons would be.  Burning flags and violence around European embassies 
throughout the Muslim world were “provoked” to paint the picture of “Muslims as 
barbarians.”  It was supposedly a European act to “assassinate the character of the 
Rasool-Allah” in order to impose a “clash” between Christianity and Islam--between a 
reformed and enlightened West and an unreformed and backward Muslim world, because 
the liberal and free Western world would feel threatened by the notion of the 
reestablishment of the caliphate.135  Politicizing religious and cultural aspects within a 
society had been historically an effective means to achieve political ends.136  In a similar 
way, Hizb ut-Tahrir works along these lines to escape further sanctions in Europe by 
emphasizing that its objectives are in the realm of the divine, and therefore impossible to 
denounce without negating Islam as a whole.  In the case of an open political opposition 
to HT’s “proclaimed religious goals”, the possibility of HT’s achieving greater Muslim 
support is likely to increase.  Even moderate, nonpolitical Islamic movements may join 
the voice of Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
3. Asia 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s presence and activities are most diverse and complex in the 
Central Asian--and lately in the South Asian context.  The spectrum of traditional, 
moderate, extreme, and radical Islamic ideology can be experienced in a six-hundred-
mile radius around the Fergana Valley, including the major regions of all seven 
                                                 
134  “Die Tageszeitung,” issued 09 August 2005, available at 
http://www.taz.de/pt/2005/08/09/a0129.1/text.ges,1 [last accessed 13 April 2006]. 
135  Hizb ut-Tahrir, “Something Rotten in the State of Denmark,” 13 February 2006, available at 
http://www.khilafah.com/home/category.php?DocumentID=12870&TagID=1 [last accessed 13 March 
2006]. 
136 Note: Gandhi successfully created an Indian nationalist movement, couched in religiously and 
culturally motivated aspects in order to create mass support.  By doing so, he elevated the Hindus on the 
one hand, but at the same time he excluded the minorities such as the Sikhs and the Muslims, who felt left 
out, although they were Indians. 
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‘stans’.137  Various classical traditions of Islam such as Sufism are indigenous to the 
territories, but are today overwhelmed with extremist Islamic ideologies such as 
Wahabbism, Deoband, and a variety of other Jihadist doctrines, to include the Taliban.  
Even the “terror ideology” of Al-Qaeda made its way easily into the region and threatens 
the reputation of Islam by couching violence and militant extremism in religious 
arguments.       
Governments of the Central Asian states have carried out massive crackdowns on 
militant Islamic ideologies in the last decade.  Groups such as the IMU (Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan) and Hizb ut-Tahrir are severely restricted by the new “laws on 
freedom of conscience and religious organizations” that limit the freedom of religious 
worship.138  Even “pious Muslims can be refused permission to pray…it [became] 
illegal to preach Islam…[and] women could be arrested for wearing the hijab (head 
covering).”139  These measures are very controversial, since the effects are felt by 
moderate Muslims along with those of criminal intent, giving Islamic fundamentalists the 
convenient counter-argument that Islam as a whole is “under attack.”  This fact is 
especially tough on millions of Central Asian Muslims who have rediscovered their 
Islamic identity after decades of communist repression of all types of religious 
expression.  As a consequence of the strong political measures, many ideologues and 
Islamists fled south to the neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan region, there falling one 
way or the other under the influence of far more violent and militant movements such as 
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.   
 
                                                 
137  Note: The seven ‘stans’ are Tajikistan, Kyrgystan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.  The Fergana Valley (between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) is 
considered a fertile area due to its natural abundance of water from the Naryn and Kara Darya rivers and its 
generally warm and dry climate.  Fergana Valley has already been the battlefield of the 8th century, when 
Islam succeeded over the Tang Dynasty of China, resulting in the separation of Central Asia from China.  
The valley is even today still considered a highly religious and conservative region, in which the past ethnic 
conflicts and rivalry have played an important role in shaping its stance.  Today, the valley is divided 
among the three above-mentioned neighboring countries and is often affected by their economic and 
political policies. 
138 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: the Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 2002), p. 125. 
139 Ibid, p. 125. 
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Hizb ut-Tahrir can be considered sympathetic to the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Both 
groups have the idealistic vision of an Islamic state, although the Taliban strives for a 
poor and Spartan life on this planet.  Life on earth is considered to be in preparation for 
the afterlife–expected to be in heaven.  Hizb ut-Tahrir, on the other hand, neither denies 
modern technology nor modern life in general.  Its spirit rather envisions a good life on 
earth as much as in heaven.  Therefore, HT creates leverage in the impoverished and 
oppressed parts of the Muslim societies throughout the region.  It intends to demonstrate 
how repressively the Central Asian governments act on Islam as a whole, although the 
party’s objectives are less religious than genuinely political in nature.  Under the guise of 
Islam, HT hides its political and socio-economic intentions to attract sympathizers and 
followers of its kind.  Hizb ut-Tahrir distributes its propaganda material and leaflets 
mostly in local languages, and holds meetings and study circles in private homes to mask 
itself from government persecution.  Up to the present day, hardly any credible evidence 
can be found that HT is involved in any violent or militant activities to extend its sphere.  
Criminal acts of individual HT followers have been reported throughout the region, but 
not in a way that the organization of HT could be held responsible for.  Hizb ut-Tahrir in 
Central Asia has so far followed its international and almost global motto of the non-
violent, pure Islamic ideology.  However, the imprisonment and reported torture of jailed 
HT members will not just strengthen the group’s urge to topple a regime, but could likely 
increase the threat of using violence as a counter-measure to the governments’ use of 
excessive force.           
B. THE WAY AHEAD 
1. The Application of the Strategic Choice Method  
Radical Islamic groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir use the liberal freedom of speech 
and freedom of opinion to propagate their extremist ideologies.  The tools of modern 
democracies allow and enable non-violent extremist ideologies to disseminate 
propaganda freely and almost uncontrollably.  The threshold of executing violence and 
other unacceptable activities, such as the distribution of anti-Semitic propaganda, are not 
likely to be crossed by Hizb ut-Tahrir, making the spread of its core ideology 
subsequently more difficult to contain for modern nation-states.  The group increasingly 
limits its ideological exposure to advocating the caliphate as a divine and religiously 
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generated message of Islam, therefore theoretically only to be denied through an open 
confrontation with Islam itself.  In Great Britain, Hizb ut-Tahrir extended its leverage 
successfully by use of this means, making it more difficult for the British government to 
proscribe the group for good.  Attempts to do so will generate religious and cultural 
opposition from Muslims throughout the country–equivalent to the “cartoon incidents” in 
Denmark. 
Suppression and repression of HT in Central Asia and the Middle East have had a 
different impact on the party’s proceedings.  While HT in these regions is not able to 
promote its doctrine openly without endangering its members, it has chosen to act 
clandestinely and in a secretive manner.  Links and connections to more-violent groups 
are not proven, although credible information indicates that the group has had an 
increasing connection in Asia to the Taliban and the IMU.140   So far, these connections 
have been based on a shared ideology, as the Taliban and the IMU likewise build on a 
Deobandi-Wahabbi tradition, which foresees seizing power as a prerequisite to imposing 
sharia law in order to finally transform society.  The tactics used to achieve their 
objectives, however, differ greatly between these groups.  The Taliban and IMU ignore 
the use of the greater jihad and have chosen the violent and militant option as the method 
of choice, whereas Hizb ut-Tahrir sticks closer to its advocated “seventh-century model 
of the Prophet Muhammad,” that preferred the method of the lesser jihad first.   
Up to this point, it seems that “Hizb ut-Tahrir–Bangladesh” has opted for one of 
the best possible strategies in proceeding.   The party branch in the South Asian region 
chose an exceptionally smart approach of selling itself in Bangladesh, which gives the 
current media and publicity secretary Mustafa Minhaj reason to believe in “succeeding 
one day” in Bangladesh.141  Both mainstream secular parties in Bangladesh are accused 
by its population of being corrupt and responsible for the political and economic misery 
of the three-decade-old state, while the majority of Islamic parties in the country 
generally are associated with militancy and political violence.  Hizb ut-Tahrir, on the 
other hand, ensures that its image stays clean as the “non-violent, success-promising, and 
pure Islamic ideology,” which can hardly be denounced by any of the local rivals.  In a 
                                                 
140  Khamidov, pp. 8-10. 
141  Rahman. 
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country with a 90% Muslim population, it is almost impossible to reject the “strict 
Islamic way of life” without denouncing Islam as a whole.  Obviously, the party would 
never get the ideological support from the remaining 10% Hindus in Bangladesh, nor 
from the few Shia, who mainly reside in the urban areas of Bangladesh; but, this stance 
still gives HT a solid base to work from.  On top of this fact, HT’s methodological 
promise of not using violence at any point to seize power gives the party additional 
legitimacy and allegiance–at least on an ideological basis.   
In Bangladesh, HT follows a four-step approach to advance its cause.  First, the 
people’s confidence needs to be earned through a continuous political process.  This is 
undertaken by a steady presence in the streets of Dhaka, Chittagong, and other powerful 
centers of Bangladesh.  Hizb ut-Tahrir distributes leaflets that address current economic 
and political events as proof of the failure of the current ideology in Bangladesh.  
Headlines such as “Only the Khilafah State can ensure your economic security,” “Our 
rulers watch the slaughter of the Muslims in Iraq,” and “Islam is the only permanent 
solution to crime and corruption in society,” are used to denounce liberal democracy and 
free-market economy as the evil, where the Khilafah State (i.e. caliphate) is held forth as 
the harbinger of success for Bangladesh.142  Hizb ut-Tahrir organizes seminars and open 
discussions in public and private universities, and also near cafes and other youth centers 
near mosques.  These actions lead directly to the second part of the four-pronged 
approach in Bangladesh, which is called the “mobilization of a people’s movement.”  
Mustafa Minhaz, the media and promotions secretary of Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh 
compares the party’s proceeding in this matter to the leftist student movement during the 
1960s and 1970s.  “The key element in their success [was] the ability to galvanize a large 
support base within university students…they first engaged the intellectually aspiring 
students…[who] in turn…attract a larger mass.”143  Private universities such as 
Independent University Bangladesh, East West University, American International 
                                                 
142  Note: The addressed headlines are all headers from electronic leaflets accessible through the 
group’s website in Bangladesh. Most of these electronic resources are available in Bangla and English 
language, available at http://www.khilafat.org/newPages/Leaflets/ 
leaflets.php?PHPSESSID=0f539b0666c4101146ef2811657e1404 [last accessed 18 April 2006]. 
143  Mahfuz Sadique, “Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam’s new face in Bangladesh,” available at 
http://www.hizb.org.uk/int/index.php?id=3070 [last accessed 17 April 2006]. 
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University Bangladesh, City University and Southeast University are central promoting 
and recruiting fields to win hearts and minds of young and intelligent students, who are 
expected to be of financial and organizational benefit for Hizb ut-Tahrir in times to 
come.144  The third and the fourth steps in Bangladesh deal with toppling the regime and 
the existing system of governance, followed by the election of a caliph through the 
participation of the people.  The slow infiltration of the country through the body of 
universities is a strategy that will take time and patience.  A mass of students and 
educated will get entrenched over time, who will eventually be able to financially, 
organizationally, and intellectually support the projected “transformation of Bangladesh’s 
society.”  This is the theory of Hizb ut-Tahrir; however, the practical application of such 
will have to survive many obstacles along the way. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir makes use of a “strategic choice” approach in accordance with the 
environment in which it is acting.  In liberal, democratic European societies, HT 
advocates its political opposition in an open manner.  The party religiously motivated 
elements in its arguments, with the intention to create mass support among the Muslim 
populations. It uses every legally permissible means to further its ends.  The otherwise 
categorically rejected “humanely derived” laws and regulations of a modern democracy 
are well-known to the party’s leaders, and in case of any attempt by European 
governments to proscribe the party (such as in Denmark or Germany), the organization 
will use its precise knowledge of modern law to counter-argue a ban.  In more repressive 
and autocratic environments such as in Central Asia, Hizb ut-Tahrir changes the strategy 
and hides its political objectives behind a religious façade.  Attacks and crackdowns on 
the group are portrayed as attacks on Islam in order to obtain continuous support by the 
Muslim population, while at the same time linkages to suspicious Islamic organizations 
and violent-Islamist are becoming increasingly hard to detect.  Last, but certainly not 
least, HT operates at the most secretive level within its original sphere of where the group 
was founded–the Middle East.  Besides a few governmental and Human Rights Watch 
reports, little information is obtainable about the current status of membership and 
activities  in  the  Middle  East.  As  different  states  and  regions  react  differently to the 
                                                 
144  Sadique. 
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presence and ideology of this Islamic fundamentalist party, it becomes evident that the 
question of proscribing Hizb ut-Tahrir becomes more and more central for every 
contemporary government. 
2. Proscription and Its Implications  
The above-average recruitment of members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Great Britain and 
Denmark is noted and observed with concern by European governments.  Official 
observers closely follow the developments in Germany, where the group has been legally 
proscribed.  Will Germany really be the “in situ” case of where to draw the line between 
freedom of expression, radical propaganda, and illegality?   
An official from the German National Intelligence Service stated in a March 2006 
interview that the ban on Hizb ut-Tahrir will make the party disappear in people’s 
consciousness, prevent open recruiting and also withdraw the group’s assets to financially 
secure itself through public donations and the like.145  He also maintains that the official 
abandonment will send a strong signal to likeminded groups and organizations that have 
chosen similar ideologies and activities.   
The structure of the group will weaken as a consequence of such actions; 
however, the spread of HT’s ideology, especially through the internet, will be hard to 
contain.  Websites that obtain the ideological works of Hizb ut-Tahrir and its founder al-
Nabhani are for the most part not registered in Germany; instead, the group uses accounts 
and domains in foreign countries, where its administrative registration of websites is not 
illegal.  The group also owns forums and chat rooms, in which idealistic Islamic ideology 
is advocated and praised.  Sympathizers can here freely exchange information, resulting 
in increased loyalty, allegiance and eventual recruitment. Now, since the quarterly journal 
“Explizit” is off German streets, and sympathizers of HT are unable to propagate radical 
rhetoric freely without facing criminal charges, it still remains to be seen how the ideas of 




                                                 
145  Note: The author of this thesis interviewed Dr. Helmut Albert, the Director of the National 
Intelligence Service of the Federal German State Saarland, on 23 March 2006.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
In over five decades of existence, Hizb ut-Tahrir has proven to be a highly 
secretive transnational Islamic fundamentalist group that has continuously expanded its 
sphere of presence.  Born in the mid 1950s in the former territory of Palestine, the party 
quickly expanded into neighboring countries and eventually throughout the Middle East.  
The group had encountered a tactical stalemate in the Middle East by the 1970s, after 
several failed coups in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan.  An extension into Europe and Central and 
South Asia was noted in the 1980s and 1990s, aided by Europe’s less-constrictive 
immigration requirements and Asia’s political opening after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union.  Today, Hizb ut-Tahrir is assumed to be either legally or illegally present 
in over forty countries, to include the United States, Australia, and even some regions of 
Africa. 
Besides the masses of biased information issued by the group itself, only a few 
scholars and journalists have managed to obtain reliable and precise data on party 
membership, group size, funding and underground activities.  The collection of 
worldwide open source data of HT members and jailed HT members clearly indicates 
that the majority and heavy corps can be associated with the Central Asian region.  This 
region deals with an estimated 20,000 Hizb ut-Tahrir members, while the European 
strongholds (Great Britain, Germany, Netherlands, and Denmark) possibly face less than 
2,500 members.146  A membership count throughout the Middle East region; however, 
would be more than just a rough guess and is, therefore, spared out at this point.   
Information from individual members through interviews is hardly available, and even if 
available can only be associated with the local--and lowest--level of the group’s structure.  
                                                 
146 The numbers reflect an estimate based on a collection of existent ‘open source’ data about HT 
members and jailed HT members worldwide.  Germany deals with an estimated 150 HT members 
according to the National Intelligence Service Reports from 2003 and 2004; Demark and the Netherlands 
can be considered with a similar amount, based on individual country and media reports.  Great Britain 
probably holds the lion’s share in Western Europe.  According to a BBC News report, 8,500 people 
attended an HT conference, paying an admission of five Pounds (equivalent to about US $8). Available at 
http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/58 [last accessed 25 May 2006] Although this number can 
not be representative for the amount of actual members, however, a deflection can certainly be done along 
with the knowledge that the ideological and media headquarters of the group are located in London, GB.   
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As a consequence of such, these statements mostly refer to local problems and conditions 
for the individual’s respective country and rarely reflect more than provincial-level 
information.  Hizb ut-Tahrir has been able to remain so secretive mainly due to two 
important factors.  One is the intentionally highly centralized hierarchical structure.  
Groups and internal cells have no more than five to eight members and parallel structures 
and cells have no reciprocal knowledge of each other.  Command and reporting lines of 
communications are strictly vertical, enabling only the higher command level to grasp the 
complete magnitude of the organization’s extent.  Local cells and individual members 
live and breathe HT ideology in small groups, unknowing and unaware of other parallel 
cells.  “Intrusions” by intelligence services are hardly possible, because the small groups’ 
members know each other well, and even live their lives so closely that only long-term 
“implants” would be able to gather valuable information.  Secondly, the structural 
framework of the organization also enforces a “need-to-know” policy for individual cells 
and members.  Only group- or cell-relevant information gets channeled down through the 
command tree, which allows selective control over specific cell activity without 
informing any other parallel level.  Consequently, the chances of success for a secret cell 
activity increase, while at the same time, invulnerability for the upper command and the 
overall survivability of the party is ensured.   
The downside of every secretive structure such as Hizb ut-Tahrir’s is the problem 
of creating mass support.  The longer that activities, member security, and protection of 
the organization remain the primary goals, the harder it will be to demonstrate transparent 
and accountable political alternatives to those who are opposed to the current systems.  
This is exactly how Hizb ut-Tahrir’s stage-two stagnation of its own agenda is caused.  
Stage one can be considered complete, as an educated cadre and a political structure have 
been built.  The organization has settled in its structure and undertaken a series of 
enterprises in the various continents.  Stage two, however, was designed to reach out to 
the rest of society, to achieve mass support and contacts to powerful people of 
bureaucracies and even politicians, in order to bring about the “peaceful and intellectual” 
overthrow of an existing government in stage three.  The secretive structure and often 
clandestine undertakings of Hizb ut-Tahrir prevent this needed support and popularity. 
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The second difficult issue in addressing the masses lies in the fact that Hizb ut-
Tahrir rejects any kind of participation in the electoral process.  Rejecting democratic 
elections and secular political systems as a whole leaves the party as an outsider of 
modern societies and state structures.  Any person’s full commitment to the group would 
make him leave the public arena, a step that a majority of Muslims is not ready to take.  
As a matter of fact, the majority is seeking to enter the public sphere and strives to 
achieve open political representation.  Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
even HAMAS, a political party that is categorized as a terror organization by the United 
States and the European Union, have chosen to enter the political process in order to 
advance their efforts.  Historical evolution and facts on the ground have persuaded many 
Islamic groups to advocate their ends with means that are accepted by modern societies.  
Hizb ut-Tahrir, however, is one of the last Islamic organizations that continues to believe 
in the success of a seventh-century model–the caliphate--ignoring the facts of today’s 
people’s demands and ambitions. 
B. THREAT ASSESSMENT 
This thesis has introduced three different regions in which Hizb ut-Tahrir is 
active.  In all of these, HT demonstrates exceptional local knowledge of political 
structures and procedures.  By choosing a strategy that best fits the regional political 
environment, HT manages to survive as an organization while it is still able to appear as a 
non-violent Islamic group.  The widespread rhetoric of being a radical Islamic group can 
only be upheld by the group’s ideological intent to “radically” change the system of 
governance in terms of changing such in a revolutionary, although peaceful, manner.  
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology strives for a sequence of seizing power first, and then 
transforming the society, while most other Islamic organizations such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood prefer grassroots activities to transform a society first, with which it is trying 
to achieve a physical majority in order to take power as a follow-on step.  This 
fundamental difference has tremendous implications.  Groups that undertake grassroots 
activities such as delivering social goods (i.e., water, food, shelter, and electricity) to 
portions of the society that are underprivileged or just have been forgotten by their 
current regimes are mostly transparent and controllable.  Social deficits caused by 
political imperfections become evident and can be counterbalanced by current regimes 
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through the political system and its administration with the effect of suffocating 
Islamists’ arguments, assuming that the government really tries to compensate for this 
lack of social goods.  In the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the process is more complex.  First, 
the party denounces all contemporary political systems and offers no basis for a political 
discussion.  Caliphate or “kufr-system” is a lot like “being with us or against us.”  Hizb 
ut-Tahrir rejects compromises with modern regimes and continuously denounces any 
active participation in current state systems.  Secondly, Hizb ut-Tahrir does not remedy 
defects and political imperfections.  The group has never helped any local population to 
restore sewage, water, electricity or the like, activities that are done by many Islamists 
throughout the Middle East in order to compensate for the lack of government 
responsibility. These facts make the threat of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Islamic fundamentalism 
primarily ideological and in some ways inviolable.   
Hizb ut-Tahrir uses the liberal western-style democratic freedoms of speech and 
religion as the basis to spread its Islamic ideology worldwide, through modern media 
tools such as the internet.  Web pages are offered in multiple languages as required, and 
are registered in countries that allow listings by Hizb ut-Tahrir.  In Germany, for 
example, although the group has been officially banned since 2003, a German-articulated 
HT website is still accessible.  The site is not registered in Germany, which does not 
make a difference for the targeted German-speaking audience that still has access to the 
group’s ideology in their language.  The internet site http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org lets 
the visitor select the German language as one of many options, while the website’s 
registrar “Network Solutions” is located in Herndon, Virginia–USA.147  Great Britain is 
used as the platform where ideologues such as Dr. Imran Waheed, other high-ranking HT 
leadership, and the group’s complete media centre are located.  But, as long as Hizb ut-
Tahrir does not clash with British laws it does not face proscription, which means that HT 
will continue to walk a fine line in spreading its anti-Semitic propaganda, thus ensuring 
its  continued  legal  presence in  Great  Britain.  Extremist  rhetoric against  Israel,  Great 
                                                 
147 Note: Information is based on “Haganah Database” available at 
http://haganah.org.il/jihadi/HuT.html [last accessed 05 May 2006]  The DNS service provider is ZoneEdit, 
Inc., New York, NY, USA.  Registrant is Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Khilafah Publications, Suite 298, London, UK. 
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Britain, and the U.S. that goes beyond allowed rules in Great Britain is mostly left to the 
South Asian media centers (i.e., Bangladesh) and websites that face less local challenge 
and no persecution.      
Central Asia has developed into Hizb ut-Tahrir’s main recruiting field in terms of 
foot soldiers.  The group clearly addresses there the lower class, less educated, and 
mostly unemployed and frustrated Muslim in order to create mass support.  Connections 
and linkages to criminal and terror groups keep damaging the non-violent reputation of 
the transnational organization, resulting in a categorization of Hizb ut-Tahrir as an 
insurgent group by the Central Asian governments.  The name of Hizb ut-Tahrir is more 
and more used along with other radical extremist and violent groups such as the IMU, the 
Taliban, or even al-Qaeda affiliates.   Central Asian territorial borders have diminished in 
terms of the spread of Islamists’ ideology, and followers can now be found throughout 
the ‘stans’, with a center of gravity in the Fergana Valley region and Uzbekistan.  The 
Central Asian republics’ hopes and expectations for economic power, political influence 
and financial wealth due to major gas and oil reserves in the region remained mainly 
unfulfilled due to the region’s landlocked position--between China, Russia, and portions 
of the larger Middle East.  The “New Great Game” has started, but mainly among the 
great powers and economies of China, Great Britain, and the U.S., who determine the 
flow of gas, oil, and money.148  Local governments, on the other hand, mainly battle 
drugs, crime, corruption, and various Islamists’ ideologies that fortunately remain largely 
disunited–at least for now.  Governments react oppressively against Islamists to maintain 
the upper hand, but are not strong enough to keep the loyalty and allegiance of their 
impoverished populations through authoritarian governance.  Each of these states fights 
various alliances of Islamist groups that struggle for power.  Also, the threat in the region 
can likewise to the European threat be considered an ideological, daily business; 
however, this indicates more and more crime and violence that comes with the religiously 
motivated extremists.  Violent responses to the use of excessive force by the governments 
                                                 
148 Note: the “New Great Game” is a term used by author Ahmed Rashid in his book “Taliban.”  The 
phrase refers to the interdependencies of politics, economics and inter-state relations between the fairly new 
independent republics of Central Asia, and the major political and economic powers such as Russia, China, 
Great Britain, Iran, and even Turkey.  Major gas and oil reserves in the Central Asian territory and 
projected pipelines routings out of the landlocked region create a complex political interdependency among 
all players.  
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and state security apparatuses are increasingly observed by repressed Islamists.  “The fear 
is that young HT militants, who now face the same indiscriminate repression and poverty 
at home as IMU militants, may soon ignore their elders’ advice and turn to guerilla 
warfare.”149  The Central Asian dilemma has turned into a vicious circle, in which the 
governments use force and repression to suffocate Islamists’ ideologies and Islamists use 
violence in return.  Smaller Islamic groups and minorities face tough state-executed 
crackdowns and the possibility of likeminded ideologies uniting for the sole tactical 
benefit of opposing authoritative regimes increases steadily. 
The Middle East threat assessment might be the hardest one to do.  Decades-long 
abandonment and underground work allows for little reliable analysis on where Hizb ut-
Tahrir stands in this region.  Government reports, messages by Human Rights Watch, and 
statements by HT itself appear only as short blips on the radar.  Continuous and useable 
data can only be obtained and analyzed in the countries that allow Hizb ut-Tahrir 
unlimited presence.  These are a minority, and especially the countries of HT’s origin 
(such as the former Palestine region and the neighboring Jordan, Syria, and Iraq) 
repeatedly executed major crackdowns on the group.  Intelligence services of the 
respective countries may have obtained better and more detailed information, but the 
sharing of such is so limited that a useful regional analysis is rarely possible.     
The assessments of threat and status quo in the three main emphasis regions of 
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East have demonstrated several important points.   For one, 
the threat of Hizb ut-Tahrir is not just international, but transnational.  Geographical 
borders do not exist for the major threat of this group–its ideology.  The group’s vision of 
reestablishing the caliphate as the harbinger for success and glory for Muslims worldwide 
has been nurtured and maintained in Great Britain for over two decades now.  Liberal 
democratic state structures and regulations allowed HT to spread this anti-secular and 
modern nation-state undermining philosophy worldwide by the use of modern 
information technology such as the World Wide Web.  Geographical borders are 
excluded in this virtual world, where ideas and thoughts travel faster than the forces that 
are trying to capture those.  A Hizb ut-Tahrir spokesman for Jordan and an official chief 
                                                 
149  Rashid, p. 132. 
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coordinator of HT in Bangladesh are both able to line up their statements in accordance 
with their headquarters’ demands within minutes.  As a consequence of such, ideology is 
getting refined and standardized for all local branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir–be they in 
Europe, the Middle East, or Asia. 
Secondly, the study elaborated the primary threat of these Islamic 
fundamentalists, which is its core ideology of establishing a caliphate.  This ideology not 
just opposes, but categorically rejects any contemporary form of state governance.  Hizb 
ut-Tahrir discards these as un-Islamic for being derived by humans and not by their 
creator.  The group does not offer any type of political compromise, in contrast to almost 
all other Islamist ideologies. Even Hamas in the former Palestine region and the Muslim 
Brotherhood across the Middle East have joined in political processes that account for 
voices of the population and ballot boxes alike.  Facts on the ground such as inter-state 
relationships based on political and economic commonalities have created a net and a 
global structure that is threatened by an ideology that strives for an all-exclusive Muslim 
dominance.  The right of existence of the state of Israel is categorically denied, and 
countries such as the U.S., Britain, France, and Russia are considered to be “at war” with 
Islam.  There can not be peace with those states, based on HT’s political agenda, which 
has been manifested in its proposed constitution for an Islamic state since the 1950s.  
Only one other transnational group envisions the same body of thought–al-Qaeda.  As 
elucidated in an earlier chapter of this thesis, al-Qaeda likewise favors the resurrection of 
a worldwide caliphate to defeat the “Western and imperialistic hegemonial” structures of 
the U.S. and the West.  Both groups couch political objectives in religious rhetoric and 
arguments in order to achieve support from Muslims worldwide.  Both groups also push 
toward a voice of a “clash of civilizations” between a “Muslim civilization’ and the 
“kufr” civilization.  Up to this day, they fortunately differ in their respective means to 
achieve the proclaimed ends.  While al-Qaeda uses militant violence in the form of 
deadly acts against civilians and military alike, Hizb ut-Tahrir follows a non-violent path 
in accordance with its documented methodology.  Political repression and the use of 
excessive force against members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the Middle East and in Asia give 
more and more reason for concern that its followers will respond with militancy and 
violence in kind.  Repressive Central Asian governments do not differentiate enough 
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between the various violent and non-violent Islamic ideologies; therefore, frustrated non-
violent fundamentalists will eventually be forced to react with militant violence in a form 
of self-defense. 
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Different regions and different political state structures have created different 
countermeasures against Hizb ut-Tahrir. All worked in some way, but none of them was 
able to contain the phenomenon as a whole.  Liberal, non- restricting policies enable the 
unrestricted spread of the group’s anti-secular ideology.  Ironically, the ideology that HT 
rejects the most gives the party the best forum to propagate itself.  Hizb ut-Tahrir uses 
freedom of speech to promulgate its own goals and freedom of religion to advocate the 
caliphate as the method of choice to overcome greed and inequality within contemporary 
systems of governance.  However, the proposed end state projects the exact opposite, in 
which Islam is to be become the exclusive religion with all other religions being 
subjugated and inferior to Islam.  As a result of these issues, more and more European 
governments have decided to opt for an official proscription of HT.  The bans undertaken 
by Germany, the Netherlands, France, and other Europeans were mostly responses to 
tighten security measures since September, 11th 2001.  The party was forced to go 
underground and intelligence services are trying to keep their eyes on developments 
below the radar. At this point, it is important to analyze and compare HT’s history and 
development in its context within the Middle East.  While HT was banned there more 
than five decades ago, the long-term results in the Middle East are far more 
representative than the less than five-year-old bans in Europe.  The long-term political 
banning in most Middle East countries indicates that major group structures have been 
fractured and demolished down to the regional level, or even further to break local cell 
structures.  Most of the countries were also able to contain the group’s ideology; 
however, this was at a time in which information exchange and communication could not 
be handled in real-time.  Modern nation-states have to be aware of the fact that modern 
communication technology, to include cell phone, satellite and internet, has bridged the 
gap of relaying and exchanging information and ideology within minutes–worldwide.  
But even besides the factor of spreading ideology, the banning of physical groups creates 
dark holes that expand over time.  Individual governments of a region lose monitoring 
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capability on developments underground.  Only the respective intelligence and security 
services might be able to track some underground activity; however, in a secretive 
structured party such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, means might be limited to maintain a solid 
picture on developments and growth over longer periods of time. 
But there are more lessons in reference to proscription.  Banning a group is like 
fighting the symptom of a disease, but not the cause.  Hizb ut-Tahrir was born in the 
midst of a turbulent time in the Middle East, and the persecution of the group was the 
first solution on hand for the governments at the time and easier than fixing the root 
problem.  The foundation of the Islamic party Hizb ut-Tahrir must clearly be seen as an 
Islamic response to the military led nationalist regimes of the 1950s.  The failure of state-
led nationalism and leftist socialism in the region provoked an Islamic response among 
many of the Arab-Muslim population throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  Islamic 
ideologies of thinkers such as Hasan al-Banna and Seyyid Qutb were often the motor for 
group formations that encapsulated violence and militancy.  Al-Nabhani’s ideology on 
the other hand resulted in the formation of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which clearly separated itself 
from these methodologies by proceeding with non-violent means.  Over five decades 
later, HT still keeps up its non-violent doctrine as a symbol of its Islamic ideology.  If 
modern secular states fight all Islamic groups, violent and non-violent alike, with one 
medication, the side-effects and unintended consequences can be expected to be single-
minded, as well.  Non-violent groups are likely to deviate from certain paths of self-
proclaimed methodologies and respond with force in order to sustain themselves.  This 
could be done by building splinter groups to handle violent responses, as well as by 
building coalitions with bigger and more experienced Islamists groups that already follow 
the militant path.  Since liberal toleration such as in Great Britain, banning such as in the 
Middle East, and repression such as in Asia are all evidently double-edged swords, other 
and more complex solutions should be taken into consideration as well. 
The first and probably most complex undertaking should be the containment of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology that undermines all systems of state governances worldwide.  
This is of exceptional importance, as the spread of the ideology is the fuel for keeping the 
flame alive and has proven lately to be immune against physical proscription of the 
group’s legal presence in a country.  The immunity has grown out of the technological 
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progress of exchanging information and communication in modern times.  In order to 
stop the spread of ideology, a combined effort among modern nation-states and their 
security apparatuses must be undertaken.  As long as Hizb ut-Tahrir is able to register its 
internet pages in the U.S. or Great Britain, outlawing the group in Germany, the 
Netherlands, and other influential European countries does not eliminate the ideological 
threat.  Suffocation of such is only possible if all states opposing the “caliphate as the 
governance of choice” agree on one common denominator and enforce regulations that 
restrict both website usage and registrations that undermine current state laws and 
constitutions.  In such a case, a comprehensive international shutdown of HT’s internet 
sites would be achievable, which could substantially influence the standardized and 
quick-spreading ideology. 
But there are other measures that are less about policing and more about curing.  
Integration and education are two key elements for increased state-society interaction and 
involvement.  These two measures are of benefit for the state and its institutions as much 
as for the individual to be integrated.  Wounds of the limited integration of Muslim 
societies and their Islamic values within the Middle East (1960s), Europe (1980s), and 
Central Asia (1990s) are still felt today and remain uncured.  Governments in all three 
regions have to focus on the problems of Muslim societies in their respective state- and 
social systems.  Cultural acceptance and tolerance on one side, combined with the 
promise of equal opportunities in upward mobility within social structures on the other 
side, would limit frustration and “rejectionism” as a basic opposing attitude.  It would in 
return create more responsibility on the side of the person to be integrated, as primary 
arguments of betrayal, inequality, and inferiority would diminish.  Integration and 
education efforts must go hand in hand.  To enhance tolerance and cultural adaptation 
among current societies, it becomes important that the various moderate forms of Islam 
are supported, while the radical, extreme, and non-tolerant ideologies are firmly rejected.    
In conclusion, it must be noted that Hizb ut-Tahrir has not been able to create 
mass support in any region in the 50 years of its existence.  This is mainly due to the fact 
that a majority of Muslims do not favor any kind of caliphate, whose idealistic success 
can objectively be narrowed down to the 32-year reign of the Prophet Muhammad and 
the first four caliphs.  It is highly likely that most lower class and uneducated followers 
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and sympathizers of HT would give up the caliphate concept in exchange for better 
integration within the existing social and political networks of modern states.  The notion 
of the caliphate is mostly to be seen as a phenomenon that was re-created in the last 
century as an alternative to other multiple failed Islamic ideologies.  Facts on the ground, 
and the economic success and wealth of some current HT leaders lead to the overall 
assumption that most of the upper class and educated HT members today have already 
assimilated well into modern society and state structures.  They are well established, with 
sufficient wealth to support the party financially.  So, what is left at the end is the main 
critique of an often-perceived betrayal and inferiority of the Muslim population, which 
can only be corrected with a combined effort by current state regimes and affected 
Muslims alike.   
An influx for the Islamic fundamentalist group of Hizb ut-Tahrir is hard to project 
and will depend greatly on the current political events associated with the ‘Global War 
On Terror’.  Islamic fundamentalists often misuse this war as an attack on Muslims and 
Islam; so it is more than ever before that this battle is for “the hearts and minds” of the 
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